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Syrian Immigrants: a Subject that Requires Protection, a Threat, or an Object of International Politics?

Introduction

The political and social changes that began in the Maghreb and Middle East (MENA) countries in 2011 in some of them introduced changes that had been expected by the demonstrators, but to a larger extent destabilised the situation and led to the strengthening of non-state actors, such as e.g. the terrorist organisation by the name of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. The political struggle for power and territory in the MENA area is extremely brutal and, combined with the ideology of the Salafist jihad, leads to the extermination of the population that shows any form of deviation from faith. It is not surprising, therefore, that there has been a huge exodus of people from these areas, and dramatic attempts have been made by many to reach safer countries.

However, there is a problem in understanding this situation and this help, which concerns not only the scale of the phenomenon facing Europe, but also the qualitative issue of the clash of cultures and religions. The so-called Arab Spring, as the political and social changes in the Arab world used to be referred to, has given rise to a wave of changes and opportunities for new political groups. This includes both new modernist political groups who oppose the authoritarian and totalitarian governments, and the return to the political scene of Islamic groups from conservative and fundamentalist circles. The changes launched at the end of 2010 have a significant and far-reaching impact not only on the stability and security in the Maghreb and Middle East regions, but also on Europe's

security. The protests against the regimes governing Arab states, from Morocco to Sudan, Syria and the Arab Peninsula, which began in January 2011, did not have a uniform character; from the relatively peaceful overthrow of President Ben Ali in Tunisia, the bloody fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya or the ongoing rule of Bashar As-Sadat in Syria, which, together with the dynamics of change, can be regarded as a catalyst for the activity of the Islamic State, on the other hand, as a field of political play of powers such as Russia, the US or Turkey, which protect their own interests. The struggle for the interests of individual actors and the inability of the central government to ensure the security of its own citizens living within the borders of the state is of key importance in determining the determinants of strengthening the position and activities of the terrorist organisation "Islamic State of Iraq" in Syria and Iraq (Islamic State of Iraq and Sham, ISIS), which was the direct cause of the wave of emigration from the areas under its control and, as a result, led to an immigration crisis in Europe.

The above factors were the direct cause of the massive emigration of Syrian people. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as of 7 November 2019, more than 5.7 million refugees were registered, including more than 3.7 million in Turkey; 918,000 in Lebanon; 654,000 in Jordan; 231,000 in Iraq; 129,000 in Egypt; and more than 800,000 in Europe with a significant proportion of European immigrants coming from Turkey.¹ In spite of certain cultural and religious solidarity, the presence of Syrian refugees is becoming an ever-increasing burden on Turkey. Since signing a migration agreement with the European Union in March 2016, their number in Turkey has increased from over 2.7 million to over 3.7 million. Increasing anti-Syrian sentiment in society is threatening the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP). Faced with the threat of a new wave of refugees from the Syrian Idlib region, Ankara is determined and ready to take radical steps to reduce the threat to the authorities' camp posed by the migration issue. On the other hand, the wave of migration that affected Europe in 2015, the cause of which is seen in the policy of open German borders and the rejection of the relocation mechanism by the governments of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia led to a conflict against this background also within the European Union itself by starting a discussion on mechanisms of assistance to immigrants based on showing cultural differences and creating a major threat.

The above circumstances lead to a research problem concerning the subjectivity of Syrian immigrants in political games between the interests of states and powers. As P. Buhler notes, "the interest is the foundation of the rationality of political action, giving politics an autonomous sphere, governed by reasons of state and independent of moral, legal and economic reasons. Just like human beings, states are rational egoists, constantly competing for prestige, resources, and security with the drug of assault."² Following this approach, the discussion on the place of Syrian immigrants within the concept of human security and the question on the validity of their subjectivity become topical issues.

¹ UNHCR, *Total Persons of Concern by Country of Asylum*, 2019, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria#_ga=2.139839738.858547710.1573988038-1746140355.1573988038 [accessed: 16.11.2019].

² P. Buhler, *O potężde w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2014, p. 94.

The underlying goal of this paper to look at the issue of Syrian immigrants in the politics of Turkey, the European Union, and Poland. The main research problem has been included in the title question, i.e. Syrian immigrants: a subject requiring protection, a threat, or an object of international politics? To achieve this research goal, despite the limited framework, the author has applied a constructivist approach to discourse research with elements of text analysis.

Refugees or immigrants: a protected entity under international law

In political discourse, especially in Poland, with regard to the introduced mechanism of relocation in the EU, a conceptual discussion has been taking place on whether immigrants from Syria are in fact to be considered refugees. A distinction should, therefore, be made between the concepts of “a refugee” and “an immigrant.” Nowadays, the most significant scope of meaning is the general understanding of refugees as one of the categories of foreigners. In its broadest sense, the term “refugee” covers all of the following persons forced, due to circumstances beyond their control, to leave their place of residence. According to this definition, the term “refugee” will refer both to the persons who have had to leave their country of origin or residence because of armed conflicts and persecution, as well as due to natural disasters.³

Under the Geneva Convention of 1951, a refugee is a person who, due to a well-established fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, resides outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable, or, due to such fear, is unwilling to use the protection of that country, or who has no nationality and is as a result of similar events, outside the country of former habitual residence, is unable or, due to such fear, is unwilling to return to that country.⁴ It should be noted that the provisions of the Convention refer to events that go back to before 1951, which expressed the conviction that the refugee problem will not occur in the future. This turned out to be a mistake and forced the international community to revise its position in the New York Protocol adopted in 1967.⁵ The term “immigrant”, in turn, refers to anyone coming from a different country, and – in accordance with EU regulations – from a third country. Therefore, until the reasons for refugee status have been examined, it is abusive to use this term in relation to all immigrants. This is all the more important as the percentage of immigrants recognised as refugees by EU Member States is marginal.

³ J. Stawnicka, R. Stawicki, ‘The concept of a “refugee” from the perspective of various cognitive planes’, *Police Quarterly*, no. 2. 4, 2015, p. 23.

⁴ Convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951, Article 1 (Journal of Laws 1991, No. 119, item 515).

⁵ *Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, done at New York on 31 January 1967* (Journal of Laws 1991, No. 119, item 517).

This distinction is fundamental when it comes to the creation of a protection entity. Immigration policy is created by individual states in relation to their own interests, which are e.g. accepting economic immigrants or refusing to accept immigrants in the context of broadly understood security. Unlike immigrants, refugees have certain rights under the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol, which are exercised under the supervision of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The UNHCR is a United Nations agency with the mandate to protect refugees, forcibly displaced communities and stateless people, and assist in their voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement to a third country. According to Article 35, “[t]he Contracting States undertake to cooperate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of this Convention. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner to make reports to the competent organs of the UN, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with information and statistical data requested concerning: (a) the condition of refugees, (b) the implementation of this Convention, and (c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refugees.”

The legal situation of each refugee is determined, in accordance with the principle of international law, first and foremost by the law of the country in which he or she resides. This rule is also introduced by the Geneva Convention, which states in Article 12(1) that “[t]he personal status of each refugee is determined by the law of the country of his permanent residence and, if he does not reside permanently, by the law of the country in which he is staying.” The enforcement of these prerogatives has therefore been ceded to individual countries. Nevertheless, international law is increasingly influencing the development of internal legal norms in this area through the formulation of general rules of conduct adopted by States in international agreements. Among the agreements that have a fundamental impact on the rights and obligations of refugees, in addition to the abovementioned Geneva Convention, the International Pacts on Human Rights⁶ of 1966 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 should be mentioned.⁷ These agreements contain the widest catalogue of human rights and freedoms, and it is noteworthy that they apply to all persons on the territory of the States party to these agreements, including refugees.⁸ The Geneva Convention sets almost no “absolute” standards for the rights and benefits of refugees. In principle, the only exceptions to this principle are: the inadmissibility

⁶ Two international agreements adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1966: *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights opened for signature in New York on 19 December 1966* (Journal of Laws 1977, No. 38, item 167) and *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights opened for signature in New York on 19 December 1966* (Journal of Laws 1977, No. 38, item 169)

⁷ *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome on 4 November 1950, subsequently amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5 and 8 and supplemented by Protocol No 2*, (Journal of Laws 1993, No. 61, item 284).

⁸ B. Wierzbicki, *Uchodźcy*, Białystok 1993, p. 62.

of discrimination against refugees on the grounds of race, religion or country of origin in the application of the Convention (Article 3) and the prohibition of expulsion or return of a refugee to the borders of territories where his life or liberty would be endangered on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (Article 33 of the Convention). It is also important that the Geneva Convention introduces three standards of refugee treatment with regard to other rights: national treatment – consists in making refugees even with citizens in reference to the scope and content of rights; treatment identical to that of other foreigners all benefits granted to refugees are in relation to the laws in force in a given country in relation to other foreigners; priority treatment – granting rights that foreigners already have or will have in the future.⁹

As has already been mentioned, Article 3 of the Convention prohibits the expulsion or return of a refugee to the borders of territories where his life or liberty would be in danger. However, this principle is not always respected, and the countries for which refugees are a problem in their internal policies have been making several efforts to bypass this provision, a case in point being Turkey's military operation at the Syrian border, and the creation of a so-called safe buffer zone, which is discussed later herein. Although the Convention imposes protection obligations on its signatories, it contains a number of exceptions on the grounds of national security. This clause was applied in the Polish discourse of security policy refusing to participate in the mechanism of permanent relocation and resettlement established by the European Commission. The exclusions invoking national security concern temporary refusal to grant protection on the territory of the state, issuing travel documents or the possibility of expulsion and return of persons posing a threat to security.

In addition to international legislation, the United Nations has also introduced the concept of human security into science. In the United Nations Development Programme of 1994, there is more than just security in the sense of survival from military threats. The authors of the report declared that human security is a universal concern and concerns rich and poor nations. Its components are indivisible, risks arising in one country can be transferred to all others. It is easier to provide them through early prevention than through late intervention. It's focused on people, on how they live their lives. It is not a question of opposing the threat to the security of states, therefore, but of combating the threats faced by ordinary people, which often stem from the very weakness of states and the political institutions that should serve them.¹⁰

Despite such important and universal ideas of the UN in the mainstream of human security, clauses concerning threats to the security of states are often used to implement particular national interests.

⁹ R. Stawicki, 'Ochrona uchodźców na gruncie prawa międzynarodowego – zarys problematyki', *Kwartalnik Policyjny*, no. 4, 2015, p. 34.

¹⁰ W. Kostecki, *Strach i potęga. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w XXI wieku*, Warszawa 2012, pp. 135–136.

Securitisation of the migration issue in Polish political discourse

The confrontation of the concept of human security usually takes place on the basis of the realization of political interests of individual states. The government's policy on the inflow of immigrants within the framework of the so-called migration crisis underwent a fundamental change with the parliamentary elections in 2015. The commitments of the government of the Republic of Poland to participate in refugee relocation and resettlement programmes were adopted in September 2015. Pursuant to Council Decisions (EU),¹¹ a total of 6,182 individuals should be relocated until 26 September 2017 from Italy and Greece. Additionally, on the basis of the conclusions of the Representatives of Governments adopted during the meeting of the Justice and Home Affairs Council on 20 July 2015¹², the Republic of Poland adopted the resolution whereby Poland has decided to resettle 900 refugees who had been located in camps in third countries. The Law and Justice government of the Republic of Poland, elected in 2015, did not undertake any new obligations in this respect by, on the one hand, carrying out declaratory actions to accept relocated and displaced persons, and, on the other hand, by making this declaration conditional on the necessity to carry out appropriate security checks on these persons. Despite the declarative sphere, the government's attitude in this respect is consistently refusing to accept the provisions of the relocation mechanism. The policy measures taken can be scrutinised in the context of the securitization discourse in the so-called Copenhagen School trend.¹³

The conceptualisation of theory begins with a statement that represents a traditional heritage: *security is about survival*. Where a problem is presented as threatening the vital interests of the reference object (things perceived as existentially endangered that have a legitimate right to survival), it justifies the application of extraordinary measures to resolve the problem.¹⁴

The most important thing in the Copenhagen school current is not only the concept, but the whole concept of securitisation, which is closely related to the understanding of security as a social construct, and, therefore, also to the discursive construction of threats. This process of constructing social threats involves a *securitization actor* – mainly the political elite – who considers the issue urgent

¹¹ Council Decision (EU) 2015/1523 of 14 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece, Official Journal of the European Union, L 239 of 15.9.2015, pp. 146–156. Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, Official Journal of the European Union, L 248 of 24.9.2015, pp. 80–94.

¹² Justice and Home Affairs Council, Brussels, 20.07.2015, www.consilium.europa.eu/pl/meetings/jha/2015/07/20/ [accessed: 16.11.2019].

¹³ A huge contribution to contemporary security research was made in the 1990s by a group of scientists, including Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde and others from the now non-existent Institute for Conflict and Peace Research (COPRI) in Copenhagen, which culminated in the work of *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Buzan, Wæver, Wilde 1998), and the proposed thought current name of the so-called Copenhagen School.

¹⁴ B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, London 1998, pp. 21, 36.

and poses a threat to the survival of the reference object. The acceptance by the recipients of a threat as existential justifies the application of exceptional measures to neutralize it. Through the securitisation movement, the issue is moved into the sphere of security (i.e. securitised) and removed from the normal boundaries of democratic political procedure, introducing, as it were, a programme of “political panic”.¹⁵ Securitization is carried out through *an act of speech* that not only expresses the preferences of the subject, qualifying a given issue as a threat to survival, presenting it as an objective image of external reality, perhaps historically even corresponding to such a threat, but also constitutes the implementation of the described truth – a power relationship. These are *securitization conditions* which, apart from their context, also require such a *securitization actor* that announces the threat from a specific location in institutional mode (having the authority to do so, e.g. as a result of the function of a minister responsible for security). In this sense, the concept of securitization does not only appear as an analytical tool, but also as a practical political tool. The migration problem in Europe has also been recognised by many countries as a threat, but it seems that only Hungary, Poland and Slovakia have effectively securitised this problem. The conditions of a securitization provide the context necessary for a successful securitization process. It should be stressed that the context of securitization results not only from the negative potential of immigrants, but also, in particular, from the real events invoked in the securitization process.

In the context of the issues discussed, pointing out fundamental axiological and normative differences between the Western man and an immigrant from the Arab-Islamic culture as a factor generating a threat seems an idea that is not without foundations. Such differences between the Polish political elites in the act of speech included in particular the different state of cultural awareness manifested in cases of women being abused on New Year’s Eve nights in Cologne and is an example of cultural and personal conditions of not only potential but also real appropriation of personal space. This situation shows that a human security policy for immigrants based on the central recognition of fundamental human rights for liberalism – life, freedom, gender equality and the pursuit of happiness – can paradoxically lead to the deprivation, or at least the reduction, of these rights of the citizens of the European Union. Immigration as a vital threat also insists on the need to ensure cultural security, which can determine the state’s ability to lay the foundations and protect cultural identities, cultural assets and national heritage, in conditions of openness to the world, as well as accession to supranational community structures, enabling the development of culture through the internalisation of values that are not at odds with its own identity. The internalisation of attitudes is the second category of securitization. The attacks that have hit Europe in recent years, such as those in Belgium in 2016, at the airport and underground network in Brussels, driving a lorry into a crowd of people in Nice or Berlin, followed by counter-terrorism operations by the secret services, highlight a much more serious problem in relation to Islamic enclaves. It is no longer just a manifestation of

¹⁵ The main concepts used by the Copenhagen School are *security complexes, sectors and securitization*, vide: W. Kostecki, *Strach i potęga...*, pp. 7–8. Ł. Fijałkowski, ‘Teoria sekurytyzacji i konstruowanie bezpieczeństwa’, *Przegląd Strategiczny*, no. 1, 2012.

dissatisfaction with the social policy of the state, but an activity aimed at the total destruction of the state and national society. The lack of effective control mechanisms and, in many cases, a conscious policy towards diasporas living in enclaves have led to the creation of an environment conducive to the emergence and development of radical Islam incubators.

In addition to the act of speech containing the above mentioned categories of differences, in 2016 the Polish government undertook concrete actions to verify the persons intended for relocation from camps in Greece and Italy. The consent or refusal procedure concerned checking the data of foreigners in available databases and conducting interviews with foreigners by liaison officers with the participation of a cultural expert competent in the field of identification of national affiliation of qualified candidates for relocation. Liaison officers appointed by the Border Guard to Italy and Greece were involved in this verification process. The examination procedures were carried out until it was ascertained that the candidates for relocation did not constitute a threat to the defence or security of the State of the tubes for the protection of security and public order. With regard to persons examined, no such certainty was obtained, as none of the persons indicated for relocation or resettlement was admitted to Poland until the end of the validity of the EC decision, referring to the Act¹⁶ whose provisions stipulate that a foreigner shall be refused subsidiary protection if he/she constitutes a threat to the security of the state or society.

However, the political discourse was not about denying the right to international protection to refugees. One should also not look for a rejection of the idea of human security in the attitude of the Government of the Republic of Poland. It was a political game against the introduction by the European Commission of a permanent mechanism for relocating immigrants arriving in Europe, almost at the invitation of Germany, in flagrant violation of the common migration policy and the protection of particular national interests. Opinion polls show that securitisation has achieved its desired effect. Negative attitudes towards accepting refugees are common in countries that define their social values in terms of the axiological and normative system derived from the roots of Christianity. Interestingly, the attitude towards relocation of refugees arriving in the European Union is connected with opinions on the principles of Community functioning. Respondents who believe that each country should be free to determine its migration and asylum policies are much less likely to accept relocation (9%) than those who would prefer these issues to be decided at Community level. Among those who claim that migration policy should be partly decided by the European Union, the level of acceptance of accepting some refugees is much higher (38%), and among those who would prefer a completely common policy, it exceeds half (53%). Respondents who would like the European Union to strive for deeper integration of all Member States (34%) are also more likely to agree to a relocation project.¹⁷

¹⁶ *The Granting Protection to Foreigners within the Territory of the Republic of Poland Act of 1 June 2003* (Journal of Laws 2016, No. 1836).

¹⁷ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from Research No. 44/2017 – Attitudes towards Reception of Refugees*, Warsaw 2017, p. 3.

These studies correspond to the opinions on relocation and attitudes towards refugees in V4 countries, so it can be stated that the Government of the Republic of Poland managed to implement the conceptual postulate of a regional security complex. The European Parliament's Eurobarometer survey carried out in September 2015 shows that citizens of Central and Eastern European countries are the least likely to support proposals for a more even distribution of refugees arriving in the European Union among the Member States.¹⁸

The CBOS has been monitoring the attitude towards the mechanism of relocation and reception of refugees since May 2015 on a regular basis. In a study published in April 2017, it is clear to see that Poles were back then still mostly sceptical about the relocation of refugees coming to the European Union from the Middle East and Africa. Moreover, since December 2015, the percentage of firm opponents of accepting part of the refugees arriving in Europe has been higher than the total percentage of moderate and firm supporters. Currently, three quarters (74%) of the surveyed are opposed to relocation, which is the highest value among the previously quoted ones, with a strong opposition (43%) being the dominant response. In total, slightly more than one fifth of Poles (22%) are in favour of accepting refugees.¹⁹

The latest research conducted by the CBOS in 2018 concluded that "Poles are not open to accepting refugees from countries affected by armed conflicts, although the willingness to provide them with at least temporary shelter depends on which country they come from. The Czechs are even more critical than Poles when it comes to admitting migrants. From October 2017 to June 2018, the strong opposition to the reception of refugees from the Middle East and Africa decreased, so there is a certain correction to the record high level of reluctance at that time. A hypothetical financial penalty on the part of the European Union worsens the attitude towards migrants from Muslim countries".²⁰

The decisions of the European Commission were taken for two years and after their expiry in 2018, the mechanism of relocation was abandoned and work was undertaken on a legislative package to develop effective methods of preventing the negative effects of a possible sudden increase in the number of migrants in subsequent years. Poland pointed to the lack of control over who enters the territory of the European Union. This threatens the security of all its citizens – some of the terrorists who carried out the attacks in France and Belgium came to Europe with a wave of refugees. Undoubtedly, abandoning the reactivation of the permanent relocation mechanism is a triumph for the interests of individual countries, especially the V4 Group. The governments of these States argued that it is for the Member States to take measures to ensure their external and internal security and that only the Member States are competent to maintain public order and ensure internal security. Security policy is therefore a matter for individual states and not a matter for Community policy. The top-down imposition of the country to which

¹⁸ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from research no. 151/2015. Relation to refugees in the Visegrad Group countries*, Warsaw 2015, pp. 4–5.

¹⁹ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from Research no. 44/2017... op. cit.*, p. 1.

²⁰ Centre for Social Opinion Research, *Communication from research no. 87/2018. Poles and Czechs' attitudes towards reception of refugees*, Warsaw 2018, p. 1.

the relocated persons often find themselves against their will means that some of them will move to other Member States. This procedure is still ongoing and applicants consider relocation as a tool for obtaining international protection and then going to the country of destination. Such mobility is caused by differences in living standards in different countries, e.g. in labour markets, access to housing or in the level of social benefits. As can be seen, these latter issues, although raised by states as a counter-argument and emphasizing the right to security and treating immigrants as a threat, are nothing more than the pursuit by individuals of the concept of human security, not only the right to survival, but also the right to a dignified life.

Turkish instrumental policy towards Syrian immigrants

Today's Europe, like a besieged fortress, is a world of coveted freedom for hundreds of thousands of migrants from failed, conflict-ridden and authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, in addition to the root causes of migration, Europe is facing the biggest migration crisis caused by the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa due to the erroneous migration policy of the European Union with the relocation mechanism and the so-called open door policy, devised by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Acts of solidarity with immigrants arriving in Europe via the so-called Balkan route have created a precedent which, in fact, suspends the application of Community asylum legislation by Germany. Undoubtedly an indirect factor, but the important one was the unsealing of borders by Turkey, which, while playing for its own interests, effectively uses the almost four million-strong migration "potential" as an argument of coercion against the European Union. On 18 March 2016, an agreement was concluded on the basis of which Turkey agreed to accept all new migrants who had been migrating illegally from Turkey to Greek islands after 20 March 2016. The basis for this was the readmission agreement concluded at EU-Turkey level. The costs will be covered by Brussels, which will transfer €3 billion to Turkey to compensate for expenses related to the reception of refugees and will speed up the €3 billion that was promised in 2015. At the same time, the Agreement stipulates that the Union will accept a Syrian refugee under resettlement procedures to a specific Member State for each person returned on the basis of a readmission agreement. Paradoxically, by opening its borders, Germany has brought over a million illegal migrants from the Arab-Islamic world into Europe, and by implementing a policy of appeasement with Turkey, the European Union can open the door to a further 75 million Turkish Muslims. The EU has committed itself to speeding up visa liberalisation and opening new chapters in accession negotiations, starting with Chapter 33, which deals with budgetary policy.²¹ Progress in this work is not yet visible, although after one year of the agreement's validity, the European Commission positively assessed its effects by stating in its communication that there

²¹ European Commission, *EU-Turkey Statement: Questions and Answers*, Brussels 19 March 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_pl.htm [accessed: 10.11.2019].

had been a 97% drop in illegal migration to Greece.²² Nevertheless, already in 2015, some EU Member States, protecting their internal integrity, responded to the threats by isolating themselves with fences (e.g. Hungary) or questioning the permanent relocation mechanism and refusing to accept immigrants from a mandatory subdivision of the European Commission (Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Poland, and also Austria in 2016).²³ The EU's positive assessment of the effectiveness of the agreement was used once again by Turkey to break off the agreement in 2017, immediately after Germany and the Netherlands banned the organisation of the electoral rallies that Turkish ministers wanted to hold in their territories in order to organize support for constitutional reform, whereby President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, seeking greater Islamisation in Turkey, would concentrate all the executive power in his hands. Turkey's instrumental actions have not only been recognised but also condemned. UNICEF called on Turkey not to use minors, refugees and illegal migrants as bargaining chip in its recent dispute with the European Union. UNICEF's humanitarian adviser Lucio Melandri said at a press conference that "children should never be used as bargaining chip and refugees and migrants should not be manipulated for political reasons".²⁴

The growing atmosphere of mistrust and recriminations is a major stumbling block in the dialogue between Turkey and the EU. In the case of Turkey, this is the use of anti-Western rhetoric in internal politics (especially in the electoral context). In the case of the EU, this is the atmosphere of seeking responsible and guilty migration crises at various levels, both within and outside the EU. In this context, Turkey is presented as a country shifting its refugee problem to the EU to media accusations of organising and supporting illegal travel to the EU. The problem of the conflict in Syria and the associated problem of Syrian refugees is a serious burden for the authorities, not only political but also economic (the authorities speak of almost 8 billion US dollars, social (impact on the labour market, disruption of the demographic structure in many cities in southern Turkey) and in ensuring security (from assassinations, feeling of criminalisation, indirectly conflict with the Kurds to the threat of escalation) with no real possibility of a positive solution to the problem. Making it possible, or even facilitating, the departure of refugees from Turkey is, in this context, an immediate reduction of the scale of the problem.²⁵

Paradoxically, the Syrian crisis and the refugee problem are treated by the authorities as a justification for the current policy, and an impulse for its intensification in accordance with Turkish assumptions. On the international arena, Turkey is once again strongly promoting the need for active action in Syria against both

²² European Commission, *EU-Turkey Statement: one year on*, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/eu_turkey_statement_17032017_en.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2019].

²³ A. Siadkowski, *Islam. Anatomia strachu*, Warszawa 2018, pp. 151–158.

²⁴ *UNICEF urges Turkey not to use children, refugees as bargaining chips*, <https://www.efe.com/efe/english/life/unicef-urges-turkey-not-to-use-children-refugees-as-bargaining-chips/50000263-3211178> [accessed: 19.11.2019].

²⁵ A. Jarosiewicz, K. Strachota, 'Turcja a problem uchodźców syryjskich', *Komentarze OSW*, no. 186, 2015, p. 6, https://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/komentarze_186.pdf [accessed: 18.11.2019].

Islamic radicals (in Turkish logic, also against Kurdish terrorists) and, above all, against Assad's regime. Ankara's aim is to create a security zone in Syria itself as a buffer for further waves of refugees, a place for the repatriation of current refugees, a base for forces capable of finally and positively ending the conflict in Syria. To this end, Turkey launched a military offensive on 9 October 2019 under the code name *Source of Peace* in northern Syria, which met with severe criticism from the European Union and ambivalent attitude of the United States. Brussels has called on Ankara to suspend its military action and five European countries have tabled a motion for a resolution condemning Turkey in the UN Security Council. During the meeting of EU foreign ministers on 14 October, the operation was condemned (despite opposition from Hungary, among others), but there was no common embargo on arms sales to Turkey (unilaterally announced by France, Germany, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands). In addition, the EU announced that it would not finance the so-called "security areas" devised by Turkey in the intervention territories. Turkey's planned activities in Syria in recent months have been presented primarily as a humanitarian project, rather than a military one. Ankara unsuccessfully sought its political recognition in the West, and ultimately also financial support for a security zone in which adequate infrastructure would be built. The course of the conducted operation seems to indicate that we are dealing with activities of a clearly military nature. Already in the first few days, the Turkish army and its subordinate Syrian opposition units, from which the Syrian National Army was formed, caused a wave of tens of thousands of refugees – mainly Kurds fleeing to areas in the interior of Syria not covered by the operation, and partly also to Iraq. In addition, several dozen civilian victims and war crimes have been documented. This course of operations, combined with plans to relocate Syrian refugees (mostly Arabs) from the Turkish territory, makes Operation Source of Peace perceived by the West as an attempt to carry out ethnic cleansing.²⁶ This is another example of the instrumental use of Syrian immigrants as part of international policy. Under the umbrella of humanitarian action, Turkey is dealing with Kurds, whose Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is treated as a terrorist organisation. The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the European public opinion openly favours the Kurds, and that European cities have been swept by a wave of demonstrations organised by the Kurdish Diaspora and its supporters. This, in turn, increases pressure both on the governments of individual Member States, and on the European Union as a whole. For Turkey, on the other hand, this is yet another reason to accuse the EU of ignoring, in Turkey's view, the terrorist activities of the PKK on its own territory. In view of the above, it is very likely that Turkey's verbal threats will also be followed by the unblocking of migration routes to Europe, which could result in serious political tensions within the EU. The political relations described above only prove the instrumental use of migration issues to realize particular interests in the spirit of political realism theory.

²⁶ M. Chudziak, *Turecka interwencja w Syrii – nowy kryzys w stosunkach Turcji z Zachodem*, <https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2019-10-16/turecka-interwencja-w-syrii-nowy-kryzys-w-stosunkach-turcji-z> [accessed: 18.11.2019].

Conclusions

To conclude, the research question posed in this paper revolves around Syrian immigrants: whether they are a subject that requires protection, a threat, or an object of international politics. The goal of the paper has been to outline the issue of immigration in the context of the realisation of national and international interests. Undoubtedly, the concept of human security is close to the work of international institutions such as the UNHCR, which aims to provide transnational solutions to the problems of immigrants, not only in terms of ensuring their survival in a state of crisis, but also in terms of a dignified life. The contemporary challenge in this sphere is the instrumental use of migration issues in the international policy as a factor of pressure or in the internal policy of individual states. As shown in the example of Turkey, Syrian immigrants are directly treated as an element of pressure exerted on the EU in the political, economic and visa policy spheres. In the case of Poland, the migration issue has been securitised as an existential threat to internal security in the context of a clash of cultures but also of terrorist threats. It also became an element of political games between the Community authorities and the right to shape the internal policies of individual states. As can be seen, despite the momentous ideas of the concept of human security, it loses to the realistic concepts of power, and particular interests of the individual states.

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Syryjscy imigranci: przedmiot wymagający ochrony, zagrożenie, czy obiekt polityki międzynarodowej? *Streszczenie*

Postawione w tytule niniejszego artykułu pytanie ukazuje problematykę imigracji w kontekście realizacji interesów narodowych i międzynarodowych. Niewątpliwie idee koncepcji *human security* bliskie są instytucjom międzynarodowym takim jak UNHCR, którego celem jest ponadnarodowe rozwiązywanie problemów imigrantów nie tylko w sferze zapewnienia im przetrwania w stanie kryzysu, ale również godnego życia. Współczesne wyzwanie w tej sferze stanowi instrumentalne wykorzystanie kwestii migracyjnych

w polityce międzynarodowej jako czynnika nacisku czy też w polityce wewnętrznej poszczególnych państw. Na przykładzie Turcji wskazano, że imigranci syryjscy są wprost traktowani jako element nacisku na UE w sferach politycznych, gospodarczych czy polityki wizowej. W przypadku Polski kwestia migracyjna została sekurytyzowana jako egzystencjalne zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa wewnętrznego w kontekście zderzenia kultury, ale i zagrożeń terrorystycznych. Stała się też elementem rozgrywek politycznych pomiędzy władzą Wspólnoty a prawem do kształtowania wewnętrznych polityk poszczególnych jej państw. Jak widać, mimo doniosłych idei koncepcji *human security* przegrywa ona z realistycznymi koncepcjami siły, władzy i partykularnych interesów poszczególnych państw.

Słowa kluczowe: *human security*, syryjska imigracja, sekurytyzacja

Syrian Immigrants: a Subject that Requires Protection, a Threat, or an Object of International Politics?

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to look at immigration in the context of the realisation of both national and international interests. Undoubtedly, the concept of human security is close to the work of international institutions – such as the UNHCR, which aims to provide transnational solutions to the problems of immigrants, not only in terms of ensuring their survival in a state of crisis, but also in terms of a dignified life. The contemporary challenge in this sphere is the instrumental use of migration issues in the international policy as a factor of pressure or in the internal policy of individual states. As shown in the example of Turkey, Syrian immigrants are directly treated as an element of pressure on the EU in the political, economic and visa policy spheres. In the case of Poland, the migration issue has been securitised as an existential threat to internal security in the context of a clash of cultures but also of terrorist threats. It has also become an element of political games between the Community authorities and the right to shape the internal policies of individual states. As can be seen, despite the momentous ideas of the concept of human security, it loses to the realistic concepts of power, and particular interests of the individual states.

Key words: human security, Syrian immigration, securitisation

Syrische Flüchtlinge: ein schutzbedürftiger Gegenstand, Gefahr oder das Objekt der internationalen Politik?

Zusammenfassung

Der Zweck des vorliegenden Artikel ist Zuwanderung im Kontext der Umsetzung nationaler und internationaler Interessen zu betrachten. Zweifellos liegt das Konzepts *human security* nahe an der Arbeit internationaler Institutionen – wie UNHCR, deren Ziel ist, transnationale Lösungen für die Probleme von Flüchtlingen zu gewährleisten, nicht nur hinsichtlich ihres Überlebens in der Krise, sondern auch bezüglich eines würdigen Lebens. Die heutige Herausforderung in diesem Bereich ist die instrumentelle Nutzung der Migrationsprobleme als Druckfaktor in der internationalen Politik oder in der Innenpolitik der einzelnen Staaten. Am Beispiel der Türkei wurde festgestellt, dass die syrischen Flüchtlinge direkt als Druckmittel gegen die EU eingesetzt werden, in den Bereichen Politik, Wirtschaft oder in der Visapolitik. Im Fall Polens wurde das Migrationsproblem als existenzielle Bedrohung für die innere Sicherheit im Kontext des Kampfs der Kulturen,

aber auch der Terrorgefahren versichert. Dieses Problem wurde auch zum Element der politischen Kämpfe zwischen den Behörden der Gemeinschaft und dem Recht auf Gestaltung der inneren Politik ihrer einzelnen Staaten. Dies belegt, dass das Konzept *human security* trotz seiner wichtigen Ideen, gegen die realistischen Begriffe der Macht und insbesondere der nationalen Interessen einzelner Staaten zurücksteht.

Schlüsselwörter: *human security*, syrische Zuwanderung, Verbriefung

Сирийские мигранты: субъект, требующий защиты, угроза или объект международной политики?

Резюме

Целью поставленного в заглавии вопроса было показать проблему миграции в контексте реализации национальных и международных интересов. Несомненно, идеи концепции *human security* (безопасности человека) близки философии деятельности международных организаций, таких как Управление Верховного комиссара Организации Объединённых Наций по делам беженцев (UNHCR), которое призвано решать проблемы мигрантов на наднациональном уровне не только в сфере обеспечения возможности их выживания в кризисной ситуации, но также в сфере обеспечения им достойной жизни. Современным вызовом в этой сфере является инструментальное использование миграционных проблем в качестве фактора давления в международной политике либо во внутренней политике отдельных государств. Как показано на примере Турции, сирийские мигранты используются непосредственно как элемент давления на Европейский Союз в политической и хозяйственной сферах, а также в сфере визовой политики. В случае Польши, миграционный вопрос был секьюритизирован как экзистенциальная угроза для внутренней безопасности в контексте соприкосновения культур и террористической угрозы. Он также стал элементом политических игр между руководящими органами (институтами) Европейского сообщества и правом (мандатом) на формирование внутренних политик государствами-членами ЕС. Таким образом, несмотря на весомость идей концепции *human security*, эта идея проигрывает с реалистичными концепциями силы, власти и партикулярными интересами отдельных государств.

Ключевые слова: *human security*, сирийская иммиграция, секьюритизация