



Kazimierz Kraj

Associate Professor, Jakub Paradyż Academy in Gorzów Wielkopolski
artuzow@wp.pl. ORCID: 0000-0002-9646-1383

Why Should Poland Not Be Afraid of a War with Russia?

Introduction

The relations between Poland and the Russian Federation have been influenced by centuries of complicated interactions involving numerous conflicts (of a military nature) and finalised with the Partitions. As a result of the First Partition of Poland, which divided the Commonwealth among three partitionists, a part of the Polish land fell under the Romanov Empire rule. For those territories, the following years were marked by unsuccessful uprisings which led to restricting the autonomy of the Congress Kingdom of Poland, as well as to increasing russification activities. At the same time, Poles were establishing themselves among the political and military elites of the Tsardom of Russia. Within the premises of the Russian partition territory, political movements and parties were formed with the aim to claim independence (e.g., PSP). Other emerging parties supported solving the social and political matters in collaboration with Russian organisations (e.g., SDKPiL). Poles were active participants in the 1905 revolution and both 1917 revolutions.

The fall of the Tsardom of Russia and the other two partitioning powers resulted in a chance for Poland to re-establish itself as a country. Without further details, this brought about another Polish-Russian clash, a war with the Bolshevik Russia and the emergence of yet another myth – this time about the defence and salvation of Europe and the world from the Bolshevik invasion.¹ This article does not at-

¹ This corresponds to a similar myth formed in the First Commonwealth times and the Polish victory in the Battle of Vienna in 1683, which created an image of Poland as a frontline of Christianity and helped the Austro-Hungarian Empire (one of the later partitionists). We forget about

tempt to reflect on the national mythomania² that, unfortunately, has a significant, if not enormous, influence on the politicians and the policy they conduct. A contemporary example of this influence can be one of the Polish myths claiming that Poland should expect an upcoming invasion of the Russian Federation, despite our membership in the North-Atlantic Treaty and the emphasised unique (sic!) alliance between Poland and the USA.

In this study, the Author uses the chronological-problem method to analyse and synthesise documents related to the foreign and security policies of the Russian Federation and Poland. Questions are posed and answered. The objective of this article is to present a short synthesis of the issue stated in the title, yet, in a narrative different from the one prevailing in the messages from Polish science, media and politics. The multiplicity of perspectives, judgements, opinions, and approaches to the discussed issue can only bring us closer to the correct diagnosis. A scientist from the security field of science, or social sciences in general, should act like a doctor – make a diagnosis which is accurate and, most importantly, based on facts rather than myths. In other words – a truthful diagnosis. Such an approach allows to solve the problem or, at least, to attempt at finding a solution in a factual, not stretched, manner. In Poland, only a small number of scientists and publicists (not to mention politicians) dares to express their rational and knowledge-backed stands and their reasonable, logical thinking. They include Stanisław Bieleń, Ryszard Łagowski, the late Ludwik Stomma, Natasza Duraj and Piotr Mickiewicz. They are researchers and publicists who are not, so to say, *Russiasfreaks*, as named accurately by the Cracovian political scientist Rafał Matyja.

Russia and the Polish national security strategy

As mentioned in the introduction, the formation of the Polish-Russian relations is influenced by a relentless stream of mythologised historical events. Following Ryszard Zięba, it may be argued that when it comes to the relations between our countries, we tend to consider only the martyr and heroic side of the Polish nation's history.³ Another matter of great significance for the Polish-Russian relations is our stand on the international security of our continent. The stand is that the approach should be highly focused on NATO, with the USA being included in the process, and on extending the North Atlantic Treaty as well as the European Union to the East. Nevertheless, it should be done without including Russia in any of these processes. Finally, according to Zięba, the third issue in the relations with Russia is energy security – a concern which Poland intends to address by eliminating the Russian

a more important issue which is the loss of sovereignty, connected with the lack of financial and monetary systems, a mint, etc. *Conf. W. Terlecki, 'Moneta zabytkowa', Ochrona zabytków 1957, 10/2 (37), pp. 123–139.*

² A. Skrzypek, 'Polska – Rosja – stereotypy', in: *Polska na tle procesów rozwojowych Europy w XX wieku*, ed. S. Sierpowski, IH UAM, Poznań 2002, pp. 154–169.

³ R. Zięba, 'Główne problemy w stosunkach polsko-rosyjskich', *Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations* 2018, no. 3, p. 9.

monopoly position on energy resources supplies.⁴ The Author points out one additional problem which is a lack of knowledge and understanding of the Russian contemporary military concepts and thinking, and perceiving the Russian ruling classes as those who do not use reason, logic, or a correct assessment of the situation and possibilities of Russia. In the Author's opinion, it is only a projection of a subjective and individual perception of the world and Russia, especially given the assumption that the opposite side also, rather than Realpolitik categories, uses myths and impressions to think. Such perception is further sustained due to the lack of actual knowledge about Russia's foreign and security policies.

The implied knowledge follows from the national mythomania about Russia, the Russians and the stereotypes that are not only no longer valid but also likely to have only been our misperceptions of the *Muscovites*⁵ in the past. A lack of interest or a fresh view on the partner, stronger in the international arena than us, is irresponsible. Moreover, allowing the perception to be distorted by experiences accumulated throughout centuries is foolish and the consequence might resemble our earlier 'accomplishments' in relations with Russia.

At present, Poland acts as if it was either at war with Russia or as if it was facing upcoming military aggression from Russia.⁶ An emanation of this argument is the content of the current national security strategy approved and published last year.⁷ It is worth mentioning that the strategy was released during the presidential election campaign in Poland and, thus, was probably meant to play a specific part in it.⁸ Unable to completely investigate this document in the article, I am quoting Piotr Mickiewicz, an expert on the subject:

The anachronistic nature of this approach lays mainly in the assumption that the current threats to the security of Poland are primarily of a political and military character. The problem of the economic, social and other threats to the safety of Poland has been constructed in such a way as to emphasise the success of the ruling party, rather than highlighting the real presence and meaning of such threats.⁹

Such a description of Poland's safety environment with respect to Russia is presented:

The most serious threat is the Russian Federation authorities' neo-imperial policy which is also realised using force. The aggression towards Georgia, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and the military actions in eastern Ukraine have all breached the basic rules of international law and undermined the pillars of the European safety system. The Russian Federation is actively expanding its offensive military potential (including

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ A. Skrzypek, *op. cit.*

⁶ R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, p. 33. It is hard not to agree with this statement from such an expert on foreign policy that Prof. Ryszard Zięba is.

⁷ *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*, Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Warszawa 2020. The strategy was approved on 12 May 2020, by the President of Poland.

⁸ P. Mickiewicz, 'O co tu chodzi? O Strategii Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego 2020', *Raport Wojsko – Technika – Obronność* 2020, no. 9, p. 36.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

the Western strategic direction); improving its anti-access systems, among others in the Baltic Sea region (including the Kaliningrad Special Region); and conducting large-scale military training based on scenarios of possible conflicts with countries belonging to the North Atlantic Alliance, fast transfer of big troop groups, and even the use of the nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation is also conducting operations below the threshold of war (of a hybrid nature) that carry a risk of a conflict outbreak (also unintended, resulting from a rapid escalation following an incident, especially a military one), as well as undertaking miscellaneous and complex actions by non-military means (including cyberattacks and disinformation), aiming to destabilise the structures of Western countries and societies as well as to create disagreement among the allied countries. It must be noted that the Russian Federation will continue its policy of undermining the current international order based on international law to reconstruct its powerful position and its areas of influence.¹⁰

The struggle for influence is nothing new in international politics and has never really stopped. The participants are the EU countries, NATO, the USA, and China. Poland also attempts to play this game (the Three Seas Initiative) but unfortunately, we do not have much leverage (economic, financial, political, cultural, or ideological). Moreover, Poland's partners, such as Hungary under the leadership of Viktor Orban, are much more skilful in terms of politics and diplomacy. They carry out a multi-vector policy, playing with imaginary projections of our relations from the past.¹¹ As the aforementioned Piotr Mickiewicz writes, "[...] this simple message is clearly dividing international players into allies and rivals without taking into consideration neither the meanders of international politics nor the long-term consequences for Poland. Moreover, this division is more of a dream than a possible reality."¹² It is hard not to agree with such an observation and therefore, it is worth giving thought to the thesis that the Polish-Russian relations are an arrangement between an object and a subject of the political game, and that Poland has become a subject in a game on the international arena following its accession to NATO and the EU, especially in relations with the Russian Federation. According to the author, the thesis can easily be refuted. There is an imbalance and complete asymmetry in the relations between both countries. Poland has virtually no tools or advantages to conduct an effective Eastern policy.¹³

¹⁰ *Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego...*, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

¹¹ One example is the famous 'victory' over Donald Tusk's candidacy for President of the European Council in 2017, in which Tusk received 27 out of 28 votes, and the one vote against him came for the Prime Minister of Poland. In the voting, Hungary did not support Poland and pursued its own political interest rather than stand up for its ally.

¹² P. Mickiewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹³ A clear example is provided by our relations with Belarus, where the attempts to use a part of our minority in the game of Belarusian politics are only a source of trouble for the Belarusian Poles and do not have any real impact on the policy of President A. Lukashenko and his political team, as shown by the recent events including the arrest of members of an illegal, according to the Belarusian law, Union of Poles in Belarus. The foolish reaction of Polish authorities who are openly calling for freedom for the detainees is contradictory to the diplomatic actions and, furthermore, demonstrates a lack of any arguments supporting Poland that could cause a change of Belarussian authorities. Therefore, let us look at the potentials of Belarus and Russia – and what we could possibly accomplish in Russia.

There is no doubt that the Polish-Russian relations are difficult and very complicated. Being the stronger partner, Russia has all the necessary tools which it uses to play the game with Poland.¹⁴ Poland, however, does not have resources equal to those of Russia, as the example of Belarus demonstrates. It is clearly visible in the current governance that the Polish authorities treat Russia as the main threat to the countries of Middle Eastern Europe and perceive Poland as the frontline of civilisation whose task is to save Europe, or even the whole world, from the consequences of the Russian foreign and security policy. In short, we are obliged to stop Russia. Polish politicians, followed by academics and the army, see these relations in a drastically simplified way – in black and white. They fail to notice that our partners, especially within the European Union, are divided and ambiguous on that matter. This is because they save themselves some space to manoeuvre when it comes to their policy towards Russia. In Poland, on the other hand, politicians and all political options are outdoing one another in presenting the most radical stand.¹⁵ Such stands, incompetence, a lack of vision and a lack of realistic policy towards our neighbour are all sources of our newest National Security Strategy. When looking at and analysing the Polish policy towards Russia, it is hard not to notice that the Polish-Russian relations and their evaluation are carried out by politicians manipulating facts and stereotypes through mass media. It can be argued that such an approach becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Given that Poland and Russia differ in their political goals (which was demonstrated in the 2014 conflict in Ukraine), the rivalry, any changes in the geopolitical arena, as well as the wish to stay in power, are only fuelling domestic political conflicts between the ruling party and the opposition. Such a race makes it inevitable for the Polish-Russian relations to be shaped by our shared history.¹⁶

Poland in the Russian security strategy

As already mentioned, the modern Polish-Russian relations are strongly influenced by the past, history, myths, and stereotypes. According to the Russian opinion, normalisation of the Polish-Russian relations is hampered by the interpretation of two key events of the Second World War – the Katyn case and the foundation of the People's Republic of Poland under the influence of the Soviet Union. Those two events combined have had a significant and increasing impact on the current Polish-

¹⁴ S. Weremiuk, 'Polska wobec Rosji w latach 1992–2014. Od zależności postimperialnych do trudnych relacji. Analiza wybranych aspektów', *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego* 2015, no. 13, p. 135.

¹⁵ R. Zięba, *op. cit.*, p. 31. Due to the academic, rather than a journalistic nature of the article, the author will not quote a Russian saying about a tiger which accurately describes our policy towards Russia.

¹⁶ See: M. Wódka, 'Relacje polsko-rosyjskie, czyli manipulacja faktami i narzucanie stereotypów przez media i polityków', *Polska – Rosja w świecie globalnych przeobrażeń*, eds. D. Jarnicki, A. Pi-skorz, INoB UPH, Warszawa – Siedlce 2018, pp. 42–58.

Russian relations.¹⁷ As Daria Zwiagina writes, Russia, being Poland's biggest neighbour, has always had a substantial and real influence on Polish politics. In her opinion, any difficulties which occur in the Polish-Russian relations are a result of having a common Slavic origin; different approaches to some political and social phenomena which occurred during the development of both countries have resulted in similarities as well as differences. Such ambivalence is thus fundamental to the competition of Poland with Russia. Therefore, we can state that the historical rivalry between Poland and Russia, especially in Middle Eastern Europe, has not lost its topicality. According to Daria Zwiagina, the concept of separating Russia from Poland by a strip of independent and loyal to Poland countries is still popular among Polish authorities who dream about Internarium.¹⁸ In other words, Polish politics, being a part of the politics of other EU and NATO countries, has been taken into account in the Russian security strategy in force since 31 December 2015. In chapter 2 of the strategy, entitled *Russia in the contemporary world*, it reads:

12. The consolidation of Russia is accompanied by new threats to national security, which have a complex and mutually bound character. Conducting independent internal and foreign policy by Russia is met with resistance from the USA and their allies seeking to maintain their dominance in global affairs. Their realised policy of deterring Russia assumes exerting political, economic, military and information pressure on it.

13. The process of forming a new polycentric model of the world order is accompanied by an increase in global and regional instability. There is a rise of contradictions related to imbalanced global development, a widening gap between the levels of countries' prosperity, as well as a struggle for resources, access to markets, and control over trade routes. The competition among countries is becoming more and more related to the values and models of social, human resources, scientific and technological development. Being a leader in the deployment of the oceans and the Arctic's resources is becoming of significant importance in this process. A whole spectrum of political, financial, economic, and informational tools has been activated for the power struggle in the international arena. The potential of intelligence agencies is becoming exploited with greater intensity.

14. The power factor does not lose significance when it comes to international relations. The quest for creating, modernising, and expanding offensive weapons is causing a weakening of not only the global safety system but also the one responsible for agreements and negotiations about armament control. Within the Euro-Atlantic, Euro-Asian, and Asian-Pacific regions there are breaches of equal and undivided safety rules. Regions bordering Russia are developing processes of militarization and arms race.

15. Reinforcing the strength potential of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and passing onto it global functions performed with a violation of international law norms, starting military activity of the Bloc countries, further expanding the alliance, and bringing its military infrastructure closer to the Russian borders – all

¹⁷ С.А. Сухинина, *Фактор исторической памяти в современных польско-германских и российско-польских отношениях: сравнительный анализ*, Санкт-Петербург 2017, р. 3.

¹⁸ Д.А. Звягина, *Внешняя политика Польши: власть традиций*, Москва 2019, pp. 154–156; see: *eadem*, 'Политика Польши в Восточной Европе: возрождение концепции междуморья?', *Россия и мир. Вестник Дипломатической академии МИД России* 2018, no. 1, pp. 78–86.

these elements are posing a threat to the national security. A significant limitation to the possibilities of supporting global and regional stability is building elements of the US missile defence system in Europe, Asia, the Pacific region, and the Middle East. The conditions allow for the realisation of the 'global strike' concept, development of the strategic non-nuclear, highly precise weapon systems, as well as in the case of weapon placement in space.

16. The ongoing Bloc approach to solving international problems does not support counteracting the whole spectrum of current challenges and threats. The streams of migration from African and Middle Eastern countries into Europe prove that the regional security system in the Euro-Atlantic region, based on NATO and the European Union, is insufficient.

17. The Western stand on counteracting the integration processes and creating conflict hotspots is producing a negative impact on the realisation of Russian national interests. The American and the EU support for the unconstitutional *coup d'état* in Ukraine has led to a great division among Ukrainian society and to a military conflict. Increased far-right nationalistic ideology, purposeful creation of Russia's image as an enemy among Ukrainian society, clear support for the use of force in resolving internal conflicts, and a serious socioeconomic crisis are all changing Ukraine into a place of long-term instability in Europe and right at the border with Russia.

18. The practice of overthrowing legal-political regimes and provoking instability and internal conflicts is gaining popularity. In addition to the ongoing hotspots in the Middle East, Africa, Southern Asia, and the Korean Peninsula, new flashpoints and zones appear outside of the local authorities' control. Moreover, the areas of military conflicts are becoming bases for the spread of terrorism, international contradictions, religious discrimination and other signs of extremism. The emergence of the terrorist organisation calling itself 'Islamic State' and the consequent strengthening of its influences was the outcome of the double standards policy conducted by some countries within the fight with terrorism domain.¹⁹

The quoted excerpt from the chapter describing Russia's situation in the modern world (the RF's security environment) demonstrates particular challenges for the national safety of this country and their complex and holistic nature. Moreover, according to the policy makers, the United States and their allies are aiming to maintain (their crumbling – author's note) dominance in global affairs. They point at new areas for competition, including the development of the World Oceans and the Arctic resources. According to Russia, the power factor is not losing its significance, and the regions bordering with Russia are experiencing an arms race and militarization. The RF expresses its concern about NATO, which began to operate on a global scale, violating the international law norms. The North Atlantic Treaty military infrastructure is being brought closer to the Russian borders. Moreover, Russia argues that neither NATO nor the European Union supports the resolution of escalating problems, given their approach to international problem-solving. Neither of the organisations is effective, as shown by the example of African and Middle Eastern emigration processes. Yet, the practice of overthrowing legal-political regimes as well as provoking instability zones and new flashpoints is popular – as exemplified by

¹⁹ Dekret Prezydenta Federacji Rosyjskiej, *O Strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego Federacji Rosyjskiej*, no. 683, 31 December 2015, Chapter 2, pp. 12–18.

the support for the *coup d'état* in Ukraine, which led to divisions and, essentially, to a military conflict as well as economic and social crises. These transformed Ukraine into an area of instability near the Russian borders.

When analysing both the Polish and the Russian strategies, we can notice certain analogies from the security environment (the positions of Poland and Russia in the modern world) perspective. The key difference is that the Russian strategy does not portray Poland as the major threat. In addition to that, the records of the Russian strategy are not unequivocal or, as Piotr Mickiewicz stated, straightforward, and they do not create a barrier for negotiations with partners. The Security Strategy of Poland from 2020 refers to the Foreign Policy Strategy of Poland 2017–2021, which emphasised the destructive role of the Russian policy aiming at creating a buffer zone out of the CIS countries and their regions. Not having anything to offer when it comes to politics and economy, Russia conducts a policy of disinformation, political and economic pressure, and ultimately – calls for war.²⁰ A Russian expert Andriej Kondratow, following an analysis of that strategy, points out that Poland is treating Russia as a long-term threat to its safety. It portrays Russia as an enemy. Any counteraction is to be in cooperation with the European Union, NATO, and the USA. The broad spectrum of stated theses in the mentioned document is related to a negative opinion on the foreign policy of Russia. Therefore, according to Kondratow, systematic and scientific studies of the organisation and tactical form of the Polish foreign policy are of utmost importance. The objective is to develop means of reaction to the possible threats to the safety and interests of the Russian Federation.²¹

Conclusion

The editorial assumptions of this article (volume) do not allow for detailed references to other documents or for opinions, analyses, or evaluations. Two key political documents – national security strategies – were quoted. In reference to them as well as other, not quoted sources and the Author's previous research, several conclusions are presented. The aim is for the conclusions to have an incentivising nature that would inspire a non-standard, non-mythologized, and non-stereotypical evaluation of the threats and possibilities of the Polish–Russian war. The Author attempts to answer the question posed in the title.

1. An attack of a military nature on Poland would certainly lead to a global conflict, given the assumed reaction of the North Atlantic Treaty.
2. The clash would be concluded with a Pyrrhic victory, and the winners would be the nuclear powers absent from the conflict (China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea).

²⁰ Strategia Polskiej Polityki Zagranicznej 2017–2021, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, p. 9, <https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKewiKvZXpj93xAhUmIIsKHRC3BtYQFnoECAIQAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gov.pl%2Fattachment%2F8196524f-687b-40e6-aca8-82c53ff8e6db&usg=AOvVaw0g8VYclZAhWYSq-MMsfZdE> [accessed: 12.07.2021].

²¹ A.И. Кондратов, 'Стратегия внешней политики Польши до 2021 года', *Обозреватель – Observer* 2018, no. 8, pp. 55, 64.

3. In the past (during the Partitions) Poland did not belong to the so-called inner circle of the empire, in contrast to the post-Soviet republics. Moreover, Poland is not indispensable for Russia's reconstruction of the position of power. We are perfectly fit to become a helper in the destruction of the oneness of the European Union, which would also impact the functioning of NATO. We are also an excellent so-called entrance window for conducting special operations against the members of the EU and NATO²², given the weak position of Poland.
4. The president of Russia and the ruling class (including the militation²³) are predictable and rational in their actions, contrary to what journalists believe. Nevertheless, it does not mean that they would abandon actions meant to expand the broadly defined political or other influences, or actions aimed at preserving the national interest of their homeland.
5. There is undoubtedly a game of influences and a new form of the world order being played – without the weakening United States' dominance. Poland is only a subject in this game, and not even the most important one.
6. Since the collapse of the bipolar world, many ongoing clashes have become different from military conflicts or *proxy* conflicts. These clashes are not kinetic but rather based on disinformation and deception, a form of what we call a hybrid war or *Myatezhevoyna (Subversion Warfare)*. Their effectiveness is relatively high so there is no need to carry out traditional military operations.
7. The actions to push Russia out of Europe, in which Poland has taken an active part, have been met with Russia's resistance undertaken counteractions. In my opinion, these responses are incorrectly interpreted as Russia's aggressive moves.²⁴
8. The outbreaks of colour revolutions (including the so-called Arab Spring), especially in areas of Russian influence, and supporting them by Western countries have been interpreted as hostile actions and as such have been met with a decisive response from the RF.
9. Research into the problem presented in the title should focus on the original state documents (written in the Russian language, not translated into English).
10. In-depth research should be conducted on any Russian academic writing dealing with the perception of Poland.
11. Scholars should, above all, bear in minds that both sides (I do not only mean Poland and Russia) carry out against each other informational operations in which all means are used, including troll factories and institutions such as Bellingcat, the Krasnaya Zvezda holding, and Russia Today.

²² K. Kraj, 'Czy Rosja zagraża Polsce? Polska w polityce bezpieczeństwa i zagranicznej Federacji Rosyjskiej', in: *Państwo, prawo, bezpieczeństwo, ekonomia i edukacja w obliczu zagrożeń XXI wieku*, eds. A. Piędel, J. Pomiankiewicz, A. Żebrowski, WSBiO, Nisko 2014, pp. 209–210.

²³ *Idem*, 'Rola i znaczenie służb specjalnych w polityce bezpieczeństwa narodowego Federacji Rosyjskiej', in: *Wymiary bezpieczeństwa na progu XXI wieku Między teorią a praktyką*, eds. A. Zarembo, B. Zapała, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2010, pp. 117–123.

²⁴ *Idem*, 'Kryzys ukraiński. Nowe spojrzenie na wojnę – z rosyjskiej perspektywy', *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe* 2015, no. 2, pp. 37–38.

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Dlaczego Polska nie powinna obawiać się wojny z Rosją? *Streszczenie*

Artykuł został poświęcony rozważaniom nad możliwościami starcia wojskowego Rosji z Polską. Opierając się na przedstawionych kluczowych strategicznych dokumentach, na podstawie ich analizy oraz prowadzonych wcześniej badań, autor odpowiada na pytanie postawione w tytule. Odpowiedź brzmi: Polska nie powinna się obawiać wybuchu wojny z Rosją. Jako podstawowe w artykule wykorzystano metody chronologiczno-problemową oraz analizę i syntezę dokumentów związanych z polityką bezpieczeństwa Federacji Rosyjskiej oraz Polski. Opracowanie zostało podzielone na cztery części. Obrazy Polski i Rosji zostały przedstawione w cytowanych strategiach bezpieczeństwa obydwu państw. Artykuł otwiera wstęp, a kończy podsumowanie, będące wynikiem prac nad tematem artykułu oraz wynika z poprzednich badań autora związanych z ewentualnymi zagrożeniami dla Polski płynącymi z Rosji. Pierwszym celem artykułu jest próba odejścia od mitów, utartych wyobrażeń oraz stereotypów dotyczących stosunków pomiędzy Polską i Rosją. Drugim celem artykułu jest skłonienie do rozważań nad polsko-rosyjskimi stosunkami, pozostawiając багаż historycznych uwarunkowań na boku.

Słowa kluczowe: wojna, strategia bezpieczeństwa narodowego, mity, stereotypy, polityka zagraniczna, polityka bezpieczeństwa

Why Should Poland Not Be Afraid of a War with Russia? *Abstract*

This article aims to reflect on the possibilities of a military clash between Russia and Poland. Based on the presented key strategic documents, their analysis and the research conducted earlier, the Author addresses the question posed in the title. The answer appears that Poland should not be afraid of an outbreak of war¹²⁵ with Russia. The article uses the chronological-problem method, as well as analysis and synthesis of documents related to the security policies of the Russian Federation and Poland. The essay is divided into four parts. Both Poland and Russia are described in the quoted security strategies of the countries. The article begins with an introduction and ends with a conclusion, the latter being the effect of work on the article topic as well as previous research conducted by the Author about possible threats to Poland coming from Russia. The first objective of the article is an attempt to step away from myths, general beliefs, and stereotypes about the relations between Poland and Russia. The second one is to encourage reflections on Polish-Russian relations while forgoing any historical prejudices.

Key words: war, national security strategy, myths, stereotypes, foreign policy, security policy

Warum muss Polen keine Angst vor einem Krieg mit Russland haben?

Zusammenfassung

Der Text enthält Überlegungen zu möglichen militärischen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Russland und Polen. Auf Grundlage der präsentierten zentralen Strategiepapiere, eigener Analysen und früherer Forschungsvorhaben greift der Autor die Titelfrage auf. Er kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Polen keine Angst vor dem Ausbruch eines Kriegs mit

²⁵ War in the sense of a military clash, followed by legal, diplomatic and trade consequences for the countries in conflict.

Russland haben muss. Der Artikel basiert auf der chronologischen Problemethode und einer Analyse und Synthese von sicherheitspolitischen Dokumenten Russlands und Polens. Der Essay ist in vier Teile unterteilt. Sowohl Polen als auch Russland werden in den erwähnten Sicherheitsstrategien beschrieben. Der Text beginnt mit einer Einführung und endet mit einer Schlussfolgerung, die auf der Arbeit zum Thema und früheren Forschungsvorhaben des Autors zu möglichen Gefahren für Polen im Zusammenhang mit Russland basiert. Das erste Ziel des Texts ist es, Mythen, allgemeine Überzeugungen und Stereotypen über die polnisch-russischen Beziehungen auszuräumen. Zweitens sollen Überlegungen zu den Beziehungen beider Länder angeregt werden und existierende historische Vorurteile abgebaut werden.

Schlüsselwörter: Krieg, nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, Mythen, Stereotypen, Außenpolitik, Sicherheitspolitik

Почему Польше не следует опасаться войны с Россией?

Резюме

В статье рассмотрены возможности военного столкновения между Россией и Польшей. На основе анализа представленных ключевых стратегических документов и предыдущих исследований автор дает следующий ответ на вопрос поставленный в заглавии статьи: Польше не следует опасаться начала войны с Россией. Основными методами, использованными в статье, являются хронологический и проблемный методы, а также анализ и синтез документов, касающихся политики безопасности Российской Федерации и Польши. Исследование разделено на четыре части. Позиции Польши и России были представлены в цитируемых стратегиях безопасности обеих государств. Статью открывает введение и заканчивают выводы, в которых представлены итоги работы над темой статьи, основанные также на результатах предыдущих исследований автора, связанных с возможными угрозами Польше со стороны России. Первой целью статьи является попытка отойти от мифов, устоявшихся стереотипов в отношениях между Польшей и Россией. Второй – склонить читателя к размышлениям о польско-российских отношениях, оставив в стороне устоявшиеся исторические детерминанты.

Ключевые слова: война, стратегия национальной безопасности, мифы, стереотипы, внешняя политика и политика безопасности