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The US post-1989 Strategy: Revisionist Powers and NATO's East Flank

Introduction

On 23 April 2014, standing on Swidwin Polish Air Force (PLAF) base, we scan the pristine sky. Suddenly, 'Sky Soldiers' from the elite 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) storm in linking up with Polish counterparts of the storied 6th Airborne 'Gen. Sosabowski' Brigade. A US Air Force (USAF) F16 squadron arrives weeks earlier integrating with the PLAF and the regional allies. With the Army on the ground, the US European Command's (USEUCOM) 'OPERATION ATLANTIC RESOLVE' (OAR) officially commences in Poland, quickly spreading across NATO's eastern flank. It is a new chapter in the US engagement in the region, Poland is at the centre of America's regional strategy and there is a clear message to Russia: 'Hands off of America's allies!' The US National Security Strategy (NSS, required annually by the US law, but in practice published sporadically), the National Defence Strategy (NDS), and the National Military Strategy (NMS) organise America's strategic thinking. Reviewing a historical selection provides insights, as the new administration articulates America's future strategy.

Strategy Continuity and Change

The 1992 NMS is hopeful as the US chart a new relationship with Russia: 'The community of nations has entered into an exciting and promising era. Global war is

now less likely, and the US National Security Strategy reflects that fact.¹ The initial post-Cold War period is punctuated by rapid downsizing of NATO military establishments, while positive steps are taken by the Russian Federation. The United States begin a significant reduction of their military posture in Europe from ~315,000 troops in 1989, to ~75,000 troops today. Opportunities emerge for integration of former Warsaw Pact nations into Western institutions – NATO is likely the first step to security and stability, and then EU membership, for economic betterment of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – the recipe is genius. Poland leads the way among the former Warsaw Pact nations, and alongside the Czech Republic and Hungary, accedes to NATO in 1999. The whole region follows, including several Western Balkans nations. With NATO membership, and its Article V guarantees, including the US-backed nuclear shield, things move in a very positive direction as the United States lead and expand global stability.

Meanwhile, Russia seems to be on the road to building a democratic society. It revises its military doctrine to be more pacifist. It withdraws forces from CEE on an unprecedented scale, retrograding its nuclear weapons to Russia. The Kremlin commits to deep reductions in its conventional and nuclear forces and accepts the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).² The 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and 1991 START 1 Treaty – significantly reducing deployed nuclear warheads – are all part of this new positive era. As CEE nations join NATO, they are full alliance members, under NATO's nuclear umbrella; however, no NATO infrastructure, bases, or forces are positioned on NATO's eastern flank, as is the norm during the Cold War.

The 1992 NMS context is after the brilliant US-led Gulf War victory. It cautions about potential conflict with North Korea or in Southwest Asia, but not with Russia. It notes the major threat of the time: 'The real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain'³ – prescient thinking when reviewing the next decade: the US homeland is brazenly attacked; NATO invokes Article V for the first time; the United States and their allies are embroiled in two major counterterrorism wars; a former KGB agent, Vladimir Putin, ascends to power in Russia; North Korea declares its nuclear potential; and China begins its unprecedented 'rise'. Yet, based on the 1992 outlook, the NMS continues: 'By far, the most consequential change is occurring within the former Soviet Union. The hammer and sickle no longer flies in Moscow, having been replaced by the Russian tricolour [...], we are heartened, encouraged, and optimistic about the future.'⁴ In 1997, the NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA) heralds more: 'NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and

¹ C. Powell General, *National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America (USA)*, Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense (HOSD), 1992, <https://history.defense.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=U2yb8zyjllg%3d&tabid=9116&portalid=70&mid=20232> [accessed: 28.01.2021].

² P. Doran, R. Wojcik, *Unfinished Business*, CEPA, 2018, <https://cepa.org/unfinished-business> [accessed: 28.01.2021].

³ C. Powell General, *National Military Strategy...*

⁴ *Ibidem*.

competition, and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation.⁵ With this incredible foundation, the 1999 NSS continues: 'We must continue leading efforts to mobilize international economic and political resources, as we have with Russia, Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and with Southeast Europe.'⁶

The 9/11 Attacks on the US homeland dramatically redirect a preponderance of the US strategic and operational attention on the global counterterror campaign. For the United States, the unthinkable occurs: a determined enemy executes a horrific attack on the homeland. During WWII, limited attempts were made to attack the continental United States, but this was another Pearl Harbour. Hence an urgent turn of strategy to counterterrorism – the 'Global War on Terror' (GWOT), which includes hope that Russia might be an ally. As 9/11 ushers in a new 'Age of Fear,' America and its allies wonder if terrorists can so easily hijack commercial airliners and use them as weapons of mass destruction against strategic targets, then is a nuclear attack on the US or their allies possible? Over time, hundreds of thousands of US troops deploy, alongside tens of thousands of allies in response. Yet, the GWOT continues – on a smaller scale – requiring allied troops and resources. The 9/11 attacks lead to the establishment of two new US strategic organisations: Northern Command and the Department of Homeland Security. Meanwhile, no consideration is given to the positioning of US forces closer to NATO's eastern flank. Instead, the withdrawal of the US forces, primarily from Germany, continues unabated.

The 2002 NSS is absorbed with countering terrorism globally: 'The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.'⁷ At peak, the GWOT spans 30 nations and 21 different operations.⁸ Regarding Russia, the NSS remains positive, not considering forward deployments on NATO's eastern flank:

Having moved from confrontation to cooperation as the hallmark of our relationship with Russia, the dividends are evident: an end to the balance of terror that divided us; an historic reduction in the nuclear arsenals on both sides; and cooperation in areas such as counterterrorism and missile defence that until recently were inconceivable.⁹

China is highlighted: 'Several potential great powers are now in the midst of internal transition – most importantly Russia, India, and China. In all three cases, recent developments have encouraged our hope that a truly global consensus about basic principles is slowly taking shape.'¹⁰ China expands aggression in the South China Sea, continues its long process to diminish and ultimately cancel democracy in Hong Kong, threatening the US Pacific allies along the way.

⁵ NATO and Russia, *NATO Russia Founding Act*, NATO, 1997, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm [accessed: 28.01.2021].

⁶ White House, *National Security Strategy (NSS) of the USA*, HOSD, 1999, <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1999.pdf?ver=SLo909OTm5IAh0LQWBrRHw%3d%3d> [accessed: 10.02.2021].

⁷ White House, *NSS of the USA*, HOSD, 2002, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss2002.pdf?ver=oyVN99aEnrAWijAc_O5eiQ%3d%3d [accessed: 10.02.2021].

⁸ Global Security, *Overseas Contingency Operation*, 2018, *Global War on Terrorism / GWOT* (globalsecurity.org) [accessed: 10.02.2021].

⁹ White House, *NSS of the USA...*, 2002

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

The 2005 NDS is cautiously optimistic: 'While remaining alert to the possibility of renewed great power competition, recent developments in our relations with states like Russia and China should encourage a degree of hope.'¹¹ In 2006, Poland decries the Russian-German undersea Nordstream (NS) gas-pipeline agreement as undermining CEE security, remaining sanguine about trusting any Russian commitment. Since the 1990s, Poland has urged US forces deployment on its territory for visible reassurance. The United States do not hold the same threat view but offer ideas about US basing aligned with American strategy which features Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) interceptors in Poland. It is not a combat unit, yet a strategic win for Poland seeking even further defence cooperation. This leads to forming a bilateral defence modernization group and plans to rotationally deploy the Patriot Air and Missile Defence (AMD) systems to Poland.

By 2008, things improve in Iraq, and allies begin troop reductions and transfers to Afghanistan (AFG). Among east flank allies, Poland is a standout, fighting in day-one combat (only two other US allies do so). Poland leads 33 nations in the multinational division reducing a major US burden. In AFG, challenges grow, and the United States and their allies increase troops levels. Poland is also one of three allies in day-one combat, and the only CEE ally which takes on responsibility for an entire province in AFG. The NDS continues to focus on the GWOT, but concerns grow about China and its increasing military power and aggression: 'China continues to modernize and develop military capabilities primarily focused on a Taiwan Strait conflict, but which could have application in other contingencies.'¹² As for Russia, the NDS paints a concerned view about the Kremlin's direction towards regional disorder: 'Russia's retreat from openness and democracy could have significant security implications for the United States, our European allies, and our partners in other regions.'¹³ Two months after the NDS ink is dry, Russia and Georgia are at war. The war occurs just four months after a NATO summit where France and Germany block the United States, Poland, and other CEE allies from offering Georgia and Ukraine NATO's Membership Action Plans (MAP) – the roadmap to NATO.

In 2009, the now infamous failed US-Russia 'Reset' occurs, and the United States cancel the BMD plans in Poland and the Czech Republic, greatly disappointing their allies who staked political reputations on the effort. Russia does allow access to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), a vital NATO logistics route to AFG. The 2010 NSS indicates recalibration: 'We seek to build a stable, substantive, multidimensional relationship with Russia, based on mutual interests.'¹⁴ Surprisingly, there is no mention of Russia's occupation of Georgia, or of Georgia at all. Instead, the United States remain determined to chart a cooperative course on key issues focused

¹¹ Pentagon, *National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the USA*, HOSD, 2005, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2005_NDS.pdf?ver=tFA4Qqo94ZB0x_S6uL0QEg%3d%3d [accessed: 10.02.2021].

¹² Pentagon, *NDS of the USA*, HOSD, 2008, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nds/2008_NDS.pdf?ver=WEYyBjnf6UkNioPqfkSr3Q%3d%3d [accessed: 19.03.2021].

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ White House, *NSS of the USA*, 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/national_security_strategy.pdf [accessed: 19.03.2021].

on the GWOT, Iran and North Korea. The United States organise a substantial Georgia 'Train-Equip' programme for military support to the weakened NATO partner.

In 2010, Patriot AMD rotations begin in Poland; meanwhile, things heat up in the Pacific and allies need reassurance – 2010 NSS: 'We will encourage continued reduction in tension between the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. We will not agree on every issue, and we will be candid on our human rights concerns and areas where we differ.'¹⁵ By 2012, with an increasingly aggressive China, the US promulgates the 'Asia-Pivot', focusing strategic and operational attention in the Pacific including increased US Navy (USNAV) and USAF activity, and a US Marine Task Force positions in Australia. The Army Patriot deployments to Poland cease due to global commitments, but a new opportunity arises assigning a permanent USAF Aviation Detachment (AVDET). Poland's F16 and C-130 acquisitions make the AVDET perfect to deepen the PLAF cooperation. The AVDET proves crucial when the USAF rushes aircraft to the region after Russia invades Ukraine.

With Poland's help, the AVDET could be expanded to include international partners. In spite of concerns about Russia, the US force reductions in Europe continue. By 2013, the United States have zero tank brigades, and only two infantry brigades in Europe. In 2014, Russia invades Ukraine, illegally annexes Crimea, and sponsors an ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine. Russia threatens CEE allies, partners and beyond, using a range of tools: hard power, hybrid warfare, intimidation, energy coercion, disinformation, and cyber warfare. In immediate response to the invasion of Ukraine, America's Sky Soldiers begin operations rapidly shaping OAR expanding to the vulnerable Baltic states. OAR units sequence back-to-back deployments, including Special Operations Forces (SOF). Almost immediately, difficult Military Mobility (MM) challenges arise: infrastructure, C2 for MM, and non-interoperable procedures. Tank MM is particularly vexing as the United States urgently return armour to Europe – to Poland in particular. The MM problem elevates to nations, NATO, and the EU to address – much work remains to be done. However, Germany, the Baltic States, and Poland significantly assist in the task, including Poland's future plan for a massive airport, and rail and road transport hub – Solidarity Transport Hub (STH) – which increases MM capability.

America's full OAR response includes the Army, the Navy, Air Force, Marines, and SOF. The US State National Guards (NG) play vital roles with their CEE partners under the EUCOM's state Partnership Program (SPP). The Illinois NG supports Polish exercise and training, and its new Territorial Defence Forces (TDF). Poland stands up its 45,000 member TDF in response to Russia's aggression, as a force-multiplier to support operational forces including hybrid capabilities. During this period, Poland commits significant defence expenditures for the Patriot AMD; HIMARS Long Range Precision Artillery (LRPA); F35 5th-generation fighter, Aermacci trainer, and additional CASA transport aircraft; upgrades T72s, and acquires additional Leopard tanks. Poland also acquires indigenously produced Rosomak Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs), 155mm self-propelled howitzers, and 120 mm mortar systems. Poland establishes a NATO multinational division HQ and adds a new mechanized division – the 18th Mechanized 'Zelazna' (Iron) Division.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

In 2015, Russia shuts down the vital US/NATO access to the NDN, and the 2015 NSS is on a decidedly new tack:

Shifting power dynamics create both opportunities and risks for cooperation. In particular, India's potential, China's rise, and Russia's aggression all significantly impact the future of major power relations [...]. We will deter Russian aggression, remain alert to its strategic capabilities, and help our allies and partners resist Russian coercion over the long term, if necessary.¹⁶

The US demonstrates significant commitment increasing the size of OAR deployments providing \$30 billion via the 'European Defence Initiative' to support OAR and the allies. The response recognizes Russia's negative direction. Russia is an authoritarian kleptocracy, revising its official military doctrine to explicitly treat NATO as its main threat. Its society is in a state of constant warfare with the West – the 'Gerasimov doctrine.' It re-militarizes the Baltic and the Black Sea littorals including significant 'Anti-Access Area Denial' (A2AD) capabilities. It very likely re-deploys nuclear weapons back to Kaliningrad (and possibly into Crimea). It attacks and seizes Ukrainian ships imprisoning its sailors, falsely claiming 'Russian territorial waters.' Moreover, Russia breaks covenants including the CFE and INF Treaties. It uses a chemical weapon for a targeted assassination inside of NATO, and the same more recently against the opposition leader Aleksey Navalny, who remains locked up in a notorious penal colony east of Moscow – likely undergoing torture.

The EU and United States apply tough sanctions on Russia, while ironically, Germany and Russia announce the 'NS 2' project – near completion – further undermining CEE's security. NATO's 2014-2018 summits drive major decisions to strengthen NATO's eastern flank, including troop presence, major exercise, upgrading MM, Command and Control, and response capabilities. The United States lead deployments in the region and codify presence in Poland, embracing Poland's proposal for a new agreement – the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), including enduring presence of 5000-6000 US armour, logistics, army-aviation, USAF, Navy, and SOF troops plus equipment in Poland.

China's aggression expands well beyond Asia. The country competes for economic, political, and even military influence in Europe, notably with its 5G offers and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which the CEE-led Three Seas Initiative (3SI) can counter. The United States have to compete globally with China, less so with Russia, but either competition can lead to a costly kinetic war. As NATO strengthens its response, the 2017 NSS and the 2018 NDS feature the looming threat of China and Russia. The 2018 NDS: 'The central challenge to US prosperity and security is the *re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition* by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers.'¹⁷ In March 2021, a new presidential administration publishes an 'Interim' NSS – what a contrast to 1992. It underlines: 'Both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to check US strengths and

¹⁶ White House, *NSS of the USA*, 2015, (nssarchive.us) [accessed: 19.03.2021].

¹⁷ Pentagon, *Summary of the 2018 NDS of the USA*, 2018, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=807329> [accessed: 24.03.2021].

prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world.¹⁸ The new administration must grapple with the renewed great power competition.

Conclusions and Recommendations

After the Cold War, the US strategy seems clear: with allies, consolidate the victory. Though continuities in strategy are seen, challenges force divergence. Important lessons can be highlighted: (1) an urgent crisis (GWOT) distracts the US strategic attention from revisionist Russia and China; (2) Georgia and Ukraine are invaded and, along with Moldova, remain illegally occupied; (3) Poland is the Centre of Gravity (CoG) for the United States on NATO's eastern flank; (4) the great power competition is back – the United States need allies and partners more than ever. President Biden plans to deliver his first NSS by summer 2021. The stakes are high. As of this article's writing, USEUCOM continues on high alert after multiple aggressive Russian air sorties occur near NATO airspace, including provocative ground force deployments threatening Ukraine. Biden's team should review previous strategies considering outcomes and lessons. These recommendations can help:

1. The NSS Law: produce the NSS annually to ensure strategic coherence and continuity of government, and so that emerging threat trends are not missed. Since 1987, the US law has required an annual NSS, which Presidents failed to produce 17 times in 33 years.
2. The Allies: the great power competition means allies are more important than ever – the United States are defeated alone. Promoting allied coherence and cohesion, the United States can lead the Western alliance in a necessary campaign to defend the rules-based international system against revisionist powers of Russia and China, and other threats. In Europe, this means strong support to the 3SI, and pushback on NS2 and China's BRI.
3. Poland CoG: Poland is a major asset to the US strategy in Europe, and a leader on NATO's eastern flank. Its strategic location, political will, military size, and capabilities are clear. Its assessments of Russia are borne out in Russia's aggression, illegal occupations, and soft-power coercion. During the Ukraine crisis, the United States and NATO scramble, and Poland provides essential support. The next NSS should articulate how the United States lead NATO to regain the initiative, stressing Poland's strategic role.
4. The US and NATO should increase east flank deployments, including the AMD, LRP, Engineers, Logistics, and Intel. The United States should deploy to Poland the full Army Vth Corps HQ, continue a rotational ABCT, but add a permanently assigned ABCT. Under the US Army's doctrine of Dynamic Force Employment (DFE), all deployed US forces should operate 'dynamically' across NATO's eastern flank, particularly to vulnerable areas: the Baltic States, the Black Sea, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

¹⁸ J. Biden, *Interim NSS Guidance*, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf> [accessed 24 March 2021].

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Amerykańska strategia po 1989 roku: mocarstwa rewizjonistyczne, a wschodnia flanką NATO *Streszczenie*

W okresie zimnej wojny amerykańską strategię w stosunku do Związku Radzieckiego można scharakteryzować określeniem – „powstrzymywanie” (Containment). Upadek Muru Berlińskiego, wyznaczający symbolicznie koniec okresu zimnej wojny, pozostawił

Stany Zjednoczone jako hegemon światowego bezpieczeństwa oraz najsilniejsze militarne państwo na świecie. Atak na Centrum Handlu Światowego był dla Amerykanów wielkim zaskoczeniem, nie tylko pozostawiającym ślady na losach indywidualnych osób w Stanach Zjednoczonych, ale trwale zmieniającym politykę amerykańską. Globalna Wojna z Terroryzmem (Global War on Terrorism – GWOT), rozpoczęta po zamachach we wrześniu 2001 r., zmieniła amerykańską strategię bezpieczeństwa oraz przyczyniła się do rozwoju nowych technologii czy środków walki. W artykule autor skupił się na zmianie polityki amerykańskiej w stosunku do wschodniej flanki NATO, a także strategicznej roli Polski w architekturze bezpieczeństwa regionu.

Słowa kluczowe: NATO, Polska, Operacja Atlantic Resolve, Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, Strategia Wojskowa, Strategia Obronności, GWOT, wojna, terroryzm

The US post-1989 Strategy: Revisionist Powers and NATO's East Flank

Abstract

During the Cold War the American strategy is clear – to 'contain' the Soviet Union and the spread of communism globally. After 1989, the organising question becomes: what is the best direction for the US strategy to ensure that democratic gains are expanded? The fall of the Berlin Wall heralds the end of the Soviet domination of Central and Eastern Europe and reduces Russia's influence globally. The US, NATO, and the greater Western alliance stand as victors of a protracted campaign which often heats up as proxy wars: Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Latin America, the Middle East. These wars are costly, but the pressure released reduces the chance of direct nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The strategy of containment guiding the US policy proves imperfect, and bloody proxy wars confirm it. Ultimately, the strategy is successful, and by the 1990s, America is the lone superpower leading an optimistic Western alliance. The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US homeland cause significant damage and loss of life, devastating America psychologically. They usher in a period of fear and dramatic response. America must retool its strategy on the fly, and the Global War on Terrorism consumes strategic attention. The distraction leaves space for a revisionist Russia and rising China. Tracing a selection of US post-Cold War strategy documents, this article explores US strategic thinking, until today's global inflexion point of the renewed great power competition. The article particularly examines the developments on NATO's eastern flank, and Poland's role in the US strategy in the region, offering future strategy recommendations.

Key words: NATO, Russia, Poland, Great Power, Operation Atlantic Resolve, National Security Strategy, National Defence Strategy, National Military Strategy

Die US-Strategie nach 1989: revisionistische Mächte und die NATO-Ostflanke

Zusammenfassung

Während des Kalten Krieges war die amerikanische Strategie klar – die Sowjetunion und die globale Ausbreitung des Kommunismus mussten eingedämmt werden. Nach 1989 lautete die Organisationsfrage: welche Richtung sollte die US-Strategie einschlagen, um die Ausbreitung der demokratischen Errungenschaften zu gewährleisten? Der Fall der Berliner Mauer kündigte das Ende der sowjetischen Dominanz von Mittel- und Osteuropa an und beschränkte den globalen Einfluss Russlands. USA, NATO und das große westliche Bündnis standen als Sieger einer langwierigen Kampagne fest, die häufig

Stellvertreterkriege mit sich brachte: Korea, Vietnam, Kuba, Lateinamerika, Nahost. Die Kriege waren kostspielig, aber der abgelassene Druck hielt die Gefahr einer direkten nuklearen Konfrontation zwischen der Sowjetunion und den Vereinigten Staaten in Grenzen. Die Eindämmungsstrategie der US-Politik erwies sich als unvollkommen, und die blutigen Stellvertreterkriege stellten den Beweis dafür dar. Letztendlich war die Strategie aber erfolgreich und in den 1990ern avancierte Amerika zur einsamen Supermacht an der Spitze eines optimistischen westlichen Bündnisses. Die Terroranschläge vom 11. September 2001 auf die USA verursachten große Schäden und zahlreiche Todesopfer und führten zu einer psychologischen Verwüstung des Landes. Sie läuteten eine Zeit der Angst und dramatischen Reaktionen ein. Amerika musste seine Strategie spontan umrüsten und der globale Krieg gegen den Terrorismus nahm die strategische Aufmerksamkeit in Anspruch. Diese Ablenkung ließ Raum für das revisionistische Russland und das aufstrebende China. Auf Grundlage einer Reihe von Strategiepapieren der USA aus der Zeit nach Ende des Kalten Krieges erläutert dieser Text das strategische Denken in den USA bis zum heutigen Wendepunkt eines erneuten Kampfes der Supermächte. Der Text befasst sich insbesondere mit den Entwicklungen an der NATO-Ostflanke und Polens Rolle in der US-Strategie für die Region und gibt Empfehlungen für die zukünftige Strategieplanung.

Schlüsselwörter: NATO, Russland, Polen, Großmacht, Operation Atlantic Resolve, nationale Sicherheitsstrategie, nationale Verteidigungsstrategie, nationale Militärstrategie

Стратегия США после 1989 года: ревизионистские силы и восточный фланг НАТО

Резюме

Во время холодной войны стратегию Соединенных Штатов по отношению к Советскому Союзу можно было охарактеризовать термином «сдерживание» (Containment). Падение Берлинской стены, символически ознаменовавшее конец периода холодной войны, сделало Соединенные Штаты гегемоном мировой безопасности и самым могущественным, в военном плане, государством в мире. Нападение на Всемирный торговый центр стало большой неожиданностью для американцев, оставило след не только на судьбах отдельных граждан, но и навсегда изменило политику Соединенных Штатов. Глобальная война с терроризмом (Global War on Terrorism – GWOT), начавшаяся после терактов в сентябре 2001 года, изменила стратегию безопасности США и способствовала развитию новых технологий и средств борьбы. В статье сосредоточено внимание на изменениях политики США в отношении восточного фланга НАТО, а также на стратегической роли Польши в архитектуре безопасности региона.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, Польша, операция Atlantic Resolve (Атлантическая решимость), Стратегия национальной безопасности, Военная стратегия, Стратегия обороны, GWOT, война, терроризм