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Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the field of energy security in the political thought of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO)¹

Introduction

For many years, ensuring Poland's energy security has been a key component of the political thought of Polish factions of different political identification. Politicians from all parties have formulated proposals for specific solutions in the field of energy security and energy policy, which, in their opinion, were to have a positive impact on state security and the position of Poland in Central Europe.

The idea of diversifying the sources and directions of natural gas supplies to Poland has brought about the need to cooperate with countries exporting energy resources. The key consequence of such an assumption was the concept of strategic energy cooperation with Norway and Denmark, formulated by politicians of many political affiliations. The major elements of this cooperation scheme include the construction of a pipeline system that enables the connection of natural gas

¹ The opinions expressed in the publication represent the views of the author only and cannot be equated with the standpoint(s) of the Institute of Central Europe.

deposits in Norway with customers in Poland, i.e. the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline.² Such activities were extremely important given the importance of this commodity in Poland's energy balance – which constitutes approx. 17% of total primary energy consumption – and the country's high dependence on the Russian Federation (approx. 56.6%),³ a country with significant world gas resources. Nevertheless, it is not only the share, but most of all the use of natural gas that was important from the point of view of energy security, as in Poland's case, a large part of natural gas is used for heating purposes and in industry, including refineries, chemical plants, and other sectors of the domestic industry.

The goal of this article is to look at the political thought⁴ of the two key political parties in Poland, i.e. Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, Law and Justice) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO, the Civic Platform), in the construction of the Baltic Pipe. Thus, the subject scope covers political thought, while in the factual sense, the study concerns the views of representatives of individual political parties on the issue of natural gas imports to Poland. The study rests on the basic method applied by researchers of political thought, i.e. source analysis, and it applies research techniques in the form of content analysis and comparative analysis, which allows for the configuration of similarities and differences in relation to the research issue at hand. The considerations contained in the article reveal the main arguments formulated by PiS and PO politicians towards the construction of the gas pipeline. The starting point for the analyses conducted was the thesis that, in the opinion of these two political parties, the concept of Polish-Norwegian cooperation was to be a proposal to solve Poland's key energy challenge, i.e. diversification of sources and directions of natural gas supplies from Russia. Taking up this particular topic is important due to the scarcity of studies that feature original findings on the actual standpoint of representatives of political parties on the construction of the Baltic Pipe.

The foundation of energy security in the opinion of PiS

Due to the dependence on the import of energy resources from the Russian Federation, the diversification of sources and directions of natural gas supplies to Poland

² M. Ruszel, A. Kucharska, *Dywersyfikacja źródeł dostaw gazu ziemnego do państw Grupy Wyszehradzkiej – wyzwania i perspektywy rozwoju*, Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowej, 2020, p. 53; P. Kwiatkiewicz, Polityczny i ekonomiczny aspekt doboru nośników energii a kwestie bezpieczeństwa energetycznego Polski, [in:] *Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne. Rynki surowców i energii – teraźniejszość i przyszłość*, vol. 1, *Polityka – gospodarka – zasoby naturalne i logistyka*, ed. P. Kwiatkiewicz, Poznań: Wydawnictwo Esus, 2014, pp.163–192.

³ *Poland 2022. Energy Policy Review*, International Energy Agency, Paris 2022, pp. 131–132.

⁴ Political thought should be understood as “any form of reflection on political reality, regardless of the degree of development, internal coherence and systematisation, as well as theorising and concretisation.” J. Jachymek, W. Paruch, Wstęp, [in:] *Więcej niż niepodległość. Polska myśl polityczna 1918–1939*, eds. J. Jachymek, W. Paruch, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2001, p. 11.

has been a priority issue for PiS. Among the energy concepts, energy cooperation with Norway has played an important role. The idea of the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline has recurred in both political manifestos and political activity of the party, especially during its rule in Poland, and the investment was a flagship project promoted at all forums. Treating the gas pipeline in strategic terms resulted from its fundamental benefit, which was the real diversification of the source of natural gas.

In the opinion of PiS, the diversified structure of supplies was a condition for the energy security of the state.⁵ In this context, Jarosław Kaczyński, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland in 2006–2007, recognised the diversification process as “one of the government’s top priorities.”⁶ PiS planned to implement this postulate through cooperation with Norway and Denmark for the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline connecting Poland with Norwegian deposits of energy resources.⁷ What is of key importance is the fact that for PiS, Norway was a key partner in the planned supplies of natural gas, which was confirmed by including this country in the plans related to the creation of the European Energy Security Treaty.⁸ As a result, PiS politicians voted in favour of reactivating the concept of building a gas pipeline connecting the Norwegian shelf with the Polish coast of the Baltic Sea,⁹ and the direct pipeline connection was to fulfil three important tasks.

First, it was to create a balanced natural gas supply structure. As a result of the investment, it was possible, on the one hand, to maintain the import of natural gas

⁵ *Program 2005. IV Rzeczpospolita. Sprawiedliwość dla Wszystkich* [s.l.].

⁶ “Premier: Najważniejsze zadanie MG to dywersyfikacja dostaw paliw”, *Wirtualny Nowy Przemysł*, 4 August 2006, <https://www.wnp.pl/wiadomosci/premier-najwazniejsze-zadanie-mg-to-dywersyfikacja-dostaw-paliw,12860.html> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

⁷ “Wypowiedź Anny Fotygi podczas debaty nad informacją ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2007 roku”, Sejm RP, 11 May 2007, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/4502edaa6c2fbb77c125745f0037938f/301fdb47f14d1be6c1257466003fd88?OpenDocument> [accessed: 20 January 2022]; K. Wichowska, J. Sobala, “To esbecka opinia, że jestem ponurakiem”, *Gazeta Polska*, 24 September 2005, no. 38, p. 9; K. Hejke, “Nie możemy zostać w III RP”, *Gazeta Polska*, 1 November 2006, no. 44, p. 5.

⁸ M. Paszkowski, “Polskie projekty na rzecz wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa energetycznego w Europie w myśli politycznej Prawa i Sprawiedliwości oraz Platformy Obywatelskiej”, *Polityka i Społeczeństwo*, no. 2, 2017, p. 71, <https://doi.org/10.15584/polispol.2017.2.5>.

⁹ The Baltic Pipe gas pipeline was to connect the gas system of Poland and Denmark. This project was related to the construction of the Skanled gas pipeline, which was to connect natural gas deposits in Norway with customers in Sweden and Denmark. The Baltic Pipe project was therefore an extension of the Skanled gas pipeline. In June 2006, PGNiG S.A. acquired 15% of the shares in the consortium that was to build the Skanled gas pipeline. Ultimately, the implementation of the Skanled project was suspended in 2009. “Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo przystąpiło do konsorcjum budującego gazociąg SKANLED”, PGNiG, 20 June 2007, <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/polskie-gornictwo-naftowe-i-gazownictwo-przystapilo-do-konsorcjum-budujacego-gazociag-skanled/newsGroupId/10184?changeYear=2007¤tPage=3> [accessed: 17 January 2022].

from the Russian Federation, and on the other hand, to create additional sources and routes for the import of energy resources to Poland.¹⁰ However, this postulate was changed, as it was recognised that as a result of the aggressive policy of the Russian Federation in Central Europe, natural gas supplies from that country should be completely suspended. Therefore, Poland decided not to extend the bilateral agreement under the Yamal contract after 2022.¹¹

Second, it was to limit the Russian Federation's ability to use "price blackmail" and "political pressure", as in the absence of diversification, the price pressure on the supply of natural gas from the dominant supplier was growing.¹² In this context, it was also possible to make independent decisions regarding the source of natural gas, as natural gas purchased from the Russian Federation was, in the opinion of Maciej Malecki, a PiS MP, "politically burdened."¹³ At the same time, it was emphasised that the opening of the new gas import route made it possible to ensure access to commodity exchanges in Europe, and thus, in the event of the suspension of natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation, to supplement the shortages with raw material from the West.¹⁴

Third, the overriding driving force was the need to increase the availability of this commodity other than those from the Russian Federation in this region, and at the same time to ensure the energy security of Central European countries.¹⁵

¹⁰ "Wypowiedź Piotra Naimskiego w trakcie przedstawienia przez prezesa Rady Ministrów programu działania Rady Ministrów z wnioskiem o udzielenie jej wotum zaufania", Sejm RP, 18 November 2015, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=1&dzien=4&cwyp=14&view=S> [accessed: 12 January 2022]; "Naimski: Dywersyfikacja dostaw gazu przed liberalizacją rynku", *Wirtualny Nowy Przemysł*, 8 June 2006, <https://www.wnp.pl/wiadomosci/naimski-dywersyfikacja-dostaw-gazu-przed-liberalizacja-rynku,10872.html> [accessed: 10 January 2022].

¹¹ "Naimski: Polska nie przedłuży kontraktu jamalskiego", *BiznesAlert.pl*, 14 August 2019, <https://biznesalert.pl/naimski-polska-kontrakt-jamalski-gaz-pgnig-energetyka> [accessed: 20 January 2022].

¹² "Sygnały dnia: Rozmowa z Jackiem Sasinem", *Polskie Radio 24*, 30 November 2021, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/13/53/Artykul/2858935> [accessed: 19 January 2022]; "Naimski: Redukujemy możliwość szantazu gazowego", *Energetyka24*, 28 December 2021, <https://energetyka24.com/gaz/wiadomosci/naimski-redukujemy-mozliwosc-szantazu-gazowego> [accessed: 19 January 2022].

¹³ "Gaz-System podpisał w poniedziałek w Brukseli umowę na dofinansowanie budowy gazociągu Baltic Pipe", *Radio Maryja*, 15 April 2019, <https://www.radiomaryja.pl/multimedia/gaz-system-podpisał-w-poniedziałek-w-brukseli-umowe-na-dofinansowanie-budowy-gazociagu-baltic-pipe> [accessed: 10 January 2022].

¹⁴ "Piotr Naimski: Nie będziemy przedłużali kontraktu na gaz z rosyjskim Gazpromem", *Polskie Radio 24*, 13 September 2021, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/399/7976/Artykul/2806230> [accessed: 20 January 2022].

¹⁵ "Piotr Naimski: Uruchomienie gazociągu Baltic Pipe uniezależni nas od Rosji", *Polskie Radio 24*, 20 November 2021, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/399/7976/Artykul/2852684> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

It was stressed that natural gas would also be supplied via the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline to other countries that have undertaken measures to diversify the sources and directions of gas supplies.¹⁶ In this respect, it was necessary to expand the infrastructure in Central Europe.

PiS politicians negatively assessed the agreement on the import of natural gas from Norway, broken by the former Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD, Democratic Left Alliance) and Unia Pracy (UP, Labour Union) government.¹⁷ The consequence of the failure to implement the joint investment were the major difficulties experienced by PiS in their negotiating with partners from Scandinavia. Kaczyński pointed to the complications in the implementation of the gas pipeline construction project, because “the Norwegians had already burned their fingers once, which was caused by the extreme irresponsibility of the SLD government.”¹⁸ It was argued that the Norwegian party remembered the contract for the purchase of natural gas negotiated and signed in 2001 by the then government of Jerzy Buzek. In the opinion of Piotr Naimski, Secretary of State and Government Plenipotentiary for Strategic Energy Infrastructure, the resignation by the government of Leszek Miller from continuing this project made Poland an unreliable partner.¹⁹

The change in the attitude of the Norwegian party to cooperation with Poland took place at the time of purchase by PGNiG SA shares in natural gas fields in Norway.²⁰ As a result, it was emphasised that the contract for the purchase of shares in

¹⁶ “Kolejna wielka umowa na dostawy gazu LNG do Polski. Sasin: To krok na drodze do pełnego bezpieczeństwa energetycznego”, Polskie Radio 24, 2 September 2021, <https://polskieradio24.pl/5/1222/Artykul/2799493> [accessed: 18 January 2022]; “Przydacz: Dokończenie Baltic Pipe leży w interesie całej Europy Środkowej”, Energetyka24, 4 June 2021, <https://energetyka24.com/gaz/przydacz-dokonczenie-baltic-pipe-lezy-w-interesie-calej-europy-srodkowej> [accessed: 9 January 2022].

¹⁷ “Wypowiedź Artura Zawiszy w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 26 January 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/070fd9b837589977c125745f00379392/b17f07185c2f6608c12574650036ef97?OpenDocument> [accessed: 10 January 2022]; “Wypowiedź Anny Fotygi w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 14 December 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/4502edaa6c2fbb77c125745f0037938f/e6a8ebbb52c24ac6c12574650045eb8?OpenDocument> [accessed: 12 January 2022].

¹⁸ “Premier Kaczyński: Chcemy kupić gaz z Norwegii”, Wirtualny Nowy Przemysł, 29 October 2006, <https://www.wnp.pl/wiadomosci/premier-kaczynski-chcemy-kupic-gaz-z-norwegii,16201.html> [accessed: 18 January 2022].

¹⁹ “Naimski: Trybunał Stanu dla Millera i Pawlaka za działanie wbrew polskim interesom”, TVP Info, 23 September 2019, <https://www.tvp.info/44515464/naimski-trybunal-stanu-dla-leszka-millera-i-waldemara-pawlaka-za-dzialanie-wbrew-polskim-interesom> [accessed: 15 January 2022]; *Premier Kaczyński...*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ In 2007, PGNiG S.A. made an agreement for the purchase of a 15% interest in three exploration and production licenses for the production of natural gas and crude oil from the Skarv and Snadd fields on the Norwegian continental shelf. “PGNiG uzyskuje dostęp do złóż gazu ziemnego i ropy naftowej na Morzu Norweskim”, PGNiG, 1 March 2007, <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/pgnig-uzyskuje-dostep-do-zloz-gazu-ziemnego-i-ropy-naftowej>

the fields, concluded by the company in 2007, had a positive impact on the negotiations regarding the construction of the gas pipeline. It was assessed that as a result of the concluded agreement, it was possible to deliver to Poland natural gas which was produced by PGNiG SA from fields in Norway. Nevertheless, the analysis of political thought shows that PiS politicians realised at the time that the purchased shares in the fields would not fully guarantee the diversification of natural gas supplies to Poland. In the opinion of Naimski, it was originally supposed to be the “first step” in the involvement of the Polish company in Norway.²¹ The situation had changed since 2015, when the increased activity of PGNiG SA was to be a strategic element of the chosen actions in Norway and purchase of as many assets as possible. This type of approach resulted from PiS’s return to the concept of building a gas pipeline.²² The actions taken led, *inter alia*, to increasing shares in the fields and to their being taken over by PGNiG SA INEOS E&P Norge AS in Norway.²³ It was emphasised that the natural gas produced by the company was to be sent directly to Poland via the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline.

In sum, it should be noted that the issue of a long-term contract for gas supplies from Norway to Poland, as part of the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline, was a pivotal solution promoted by PiS. Politicians of this political party emphasised that the construction of a direct connection between the natural gas fields on the Norwegian continental shelf and the Polish coast would have a significant impact on the country’s energy security by ensuring the diversification of the sources and routes of natural gas supplies to Poland. An important activity in this respect was the activity of PGNiG SA on the Norwegian market, including the acquisition of mining assets.

Continuation of key energy projects in the opinion of the PO

PO politicians have repeatedly referred to the need to diversify the sources and routes of natural gas supplies to Poland. Representatives of this political faction have assigned an important role to international projects, in particular Polish-Norwegian energy cooperation. The views that were being formulated had direct

na-morzu-norweskim/newsGroupId/10184?changeYear=2007%C2%A4tPage=6 [accessed: 21 January 2022].

²¹ “Sygnały dnia: Rozmowa z Piotrem Naimskim”, Polskie Radio 24, 5 March 2007, <https://www.polskieradio.pl/7/129/Artykul/237753,Partia-rosyjska-w-Polsce> [accessed: 18 January 2022].

²² A. Piziak-Rapacz, “Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w polityce rządu koalicji PiS, LPR i Samoobrony (2005–2007) oraz rządu Beaty Szydło – analiza porównawcza”, *Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka*, no. 1 (22), 2016, p. 156.

²³ “Strategiczna transakcja PGNiG w Norwegii”, PGNiG, 25 March 2021, <https://pgnig.pl/aktualnosci/-/news-list/id/strategiczna-transakcja-pgnig-w-norwegii/newsGroupId/10184> [accessed: 14 January 2022].

consequences on political practice, and thus on the measures taken to build the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline.

Politicians became aware of the international situation of Poland, including the degree of dependence of the domestic economy on the supply of energy resources originating from the Russian Federation. They negatively assessed this type of dependency, which had a direct impact on the energy security of the state. As Wojciech Wilk, an MP affiliated with PO, once pointed out, this situation meant that “a problem with gas supplies from the East may arise overnight.”²⁴ PO politicians saw possible threats resulting from basing imports on only one supplier, because such a situation could be used “as an instrument of economic pressure, often blackmail from producer countries that treat commodity policy in political terms.”²⁵ The general opinion of PO was that energy issues played a key role in the state’s foreign policy, thus becoming its integral part. Krzysztof Zaremba, a PO MP, even believed that “energy resources [had] replaced tanks, and military action.”²⁶ One of the consequences of such views was the need to maintain state supervision over key energy companies, which included, *inter alia*, PGNiG SA and Gaz-System SA.²⁷

PO politicians have repeatedly pointed out that “the main problem with gas supplies to Poland is [...] the lack of diversification of supply sources [...], not intermediaries.”²⁸ They critically assessed the energy policy pursued by the SLD government in 2001-2005. The key allegation was the “failure to diversify gas supplies to Poland, including [...] abandonment of the Norwegian project, [...] abandonment of the Yamal II project, [...] failure to increase domestic gas production, [...] failure to increase the storage space to the EU requirements, as well as [...] not implementing new concepts, such as the Amber project or the project of importing

²⁴ „Wypowiedź Wojciecha Wilka w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 11 January 2007, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/9a905bcb5531f478c125745f0037938e/7dde8e6e886f028ac125746500472df1?OpenDocument> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

²⁵ “Wypowiedź Norberta Olbryckiego w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu”, Sejm RP, 21 February 2019, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=77&dzien=4&wyp=251&view=S> [accessed: 20 January 2022].

²⁶ “Wypowiedź Krzysztofa Zaremby w trakcie debaty nad informacją ministra spraw zagranicznych o zadaniach polskiej polityki zagranicznej w 2006 roku”, Sejm RP, 15 February 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/070fd9b837589977c125745f00379392/4eccb99a20d6020ec125746500373904?OpenDocument> [accessed: 18 January 2022].

²⁷ “Wypowiedź Jana Wyrowińskiego w trakcie debaty nad informacją rządu na temat kierunków prywatyzacji w roku 2006, sprawowania nadzoru właścicielskiego nad spółkami z udziałem Skarbu Państwa jak i innymi państwowymi osobami prawnymi”, Sejm RP, 11 May 2006, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata5.nsf/070fd9b837589977c125745f00379392/394762c3294bc0a9c1257465003a7b2f?OpenDocument> [accessed: 14 January 2022].

²⁸ “Wypowiedź Zbigniewa Chlebowskiego w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 5 May 2005, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/7af1a583a131a9c9c12574790041f5ba?OpenDocument> [accessed: 11 January 2022].

gas from other regions of the world to Poland, for example from the Transcaucasia and Arab countries.”²⁹

Among the concepts for the diversification of natural gas supplies to Poland, the politicians of PO pointed to the project of building a direct Polish-Norwegian gas connection. In the opinion of PO representatives, three elements determined the advantages of the contract signed by the government of Buzek. First, the possibility of re-exporting natural gas purchased by Poland. This type of provision in the contract made it possible to resell the purchased this commodity when it was impossible to fully use it for domestic needs. Second, limited investment costs, as the pipeline was to be built by the Norwegian side, so there was no need for Polish enterprises and the state budget to allocate funds for this purpose. Third, physical diversification of supply sources. As a result of the investment, in line with the position of PO politicians, there would be “a possibility to overcome this situation [...] in which 90% of gas supplies come from a single source.”³⁰ In the opinion of Janusz Lewandowski, a PO politician, “only gas supplies from Norway mean [...] the desired level of energy security.”³¹

PO politicians believed that the resignation by Leszek Miller’s government from the concluded agreement was a “strange negotiating tactic”³² used in talks with the Russian Federation to purchase natural gas. In their opinion, the criticism of the Norwegian contract presented in public by the SLD government was an inappropriate negotiation procedure.³³ Despite the positive attitude towards the concept of building the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline in 2007–2015, the government coalition of the PO-PSL did not conduct Polish-Norwegian energy cooperation in this area. This type of accusation was made by Janusz Kowalski, an MP from Solidarna Polska, who claimed that work on the construction of the gas pipeline was suspended due to the government of Donald Tusk, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland in

²⁹ “Wypowiedź Adama Szejnfelda w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu RP”, Sejm RP, 7 July 2005, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/6f1bf9590b2955f7c125747b0035cb02?OpenDocument> [accessed: 9 January 2022].

³⁰ “Wypowiedź Jana Rokity w trakcie debaty nad rozpatrzeniem wniosku o wyrażenie wotum nieufności ministrowi Skarbu Państwa Wiesławowi Kaczmarkowi”, Sejm RP, 9 January 2002, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/1bc999c5155faadac12574720025c0dd?OpenDocument> [accessed: 5 January 2022].

³¹ J. Dudala, “Nie politykujmy tylko działajmy”, *Nowy Przemysł. Miesięcznik Gospodarczy*, no. 3, 2004, p. 16.

³² “Wypowiedź Jana Rokity w trakcie debaty nad rozpatrzeniem wniosku o wyrażenie wotum nieufności ministrowi Skarbu Państwa Wiesławowi Kaczmarkowi”, Sejm RP, 9 January 2002, <https://orka2.sejm.gov.pl/Debata4.nsf/4fb829a81a8d007ac125746d0030d0fb/1bc999c5155faadac12574720025c0dd?OpenDocument> [accessed: 5 January 2022].

³³ “Posiedzenie Komisji Gospodarki, Komisji do Spraw Kontroli Państwowej oraz Komisji Skarbu Państwa”, Sejm RP, 14 July 2004, <https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/wgsknrn/GOS-229> [accessed: 4 February 2022].

2007–2014.³⁴ Nevertheless, Michał Szubski, president of the management board of PGNiG SA in 2008–2011, claimed that “Norwegian companies withdrew from the project,”³⁵ which resulted in the company’s inactivity in the context of further work on the construction of the gas pipeline.

PO politicians have supported the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline and the actions taken by the PiS government since 2015, but they have also seen the threats resulting from the timely commissioning of the pipeline.³⁶ In this context, they have raised the need to continue talks with the Russian Federation to extend the contract for the import of natural gas, so that Poland would not run out of gas. Włodzimierz Karpiński, Minister of the Treasury in 2013–2015, emphasised the fact that “in order to have any chance of a possible extension of gas supplies from Russia, in the event of delays in the case of Baltic Pipe, this year [2019 – M.P.] should open a negotiation window with Russia.”³⁷ Basically, the party’s approach to the construction of the gas pipeline was based on market principles, so when importing natural gas, the key aspect in the opinion of politicians from this party was the price, not the source of this commodity. Radosław Sikorski, an MP affiliated with PO, highlighted the fact that “this gas [had to] be purchased on the most favourable terms.”³⁸ For this reason, in the opinion of PO, it was possible to continue importing natural gas from Russia, provided that appropriate contractual conditions were ensured.³⁹

To sum up, it should be noted that the analysis of the political thought of PO indicates a different approach to PiS towards Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the field of natural gas supplies to Poland. A characteristic feature of the PO politicians’ thinking towards building a diversified structure of natural gas imports was the fact that the state’s energy security was based on political and economic cooperation with exporters of energy resources, including Norway. Nevertheless, the positive verbal position towards Polish-Norwegian cooperation, in fact, due to the negative

³⁴ “Polityka energetyczna Donalda Tuska. Janusz Kowalski: Był uległy wobec Rosjan, blokował Baltic Pipe”, *Polskie Radio 24*, 14 December 2021, <https://polskieradio24.pl/130/8358/Artykul/2868446> [accessed: 14 January 2022].

³⁵ “Posiedzenie Komisji Skarbu Państwa”, *Sejm RP*, 12 May 2011, <https://orka.sejm.gov.pl/Biuletyn.nsf/wgskrn6/SUP-190> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

³⁶ “Wypowiedź Sławomira Nitrasa w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu”, *Sejm RP*, 6 June 2018, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/sejm8.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=63&dzien=2&wyp=62&view=S> [accessed: 21 January 2022]; “Wypowiedź Michała Urbaniaka w trakcie posiedzenia Sejmu”, *Sejm RP*, 12 January 2022, <https://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm9.nsf/wypowiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=46&dzien=1&wyp=287&view=S> [accessed: 15 January 2022].

³⁷ “Karpiński: Jesteśmy za Baltic Pipe, ale krytykujemy układ z Danią”, *BiznesAlert.pl*, 5 March 2019, <https://biznesalert.pl/karpinski-po-baltic-pipe-opozycja> [accessed: 10 January 2022].

³⁸ “Sikorski: Gazprom nas ograł”, *BiznesAlert.pl*, 24 January 2022, <https://biznesalert.pl/sikorski-gazprom-nas-ogral-rozmowa> [accessed: 26 January 2022].

³⁹ J. Sanecka-Tyczyńska, *Racja stanu we współczesnej polskiej myśli politycznej 2001–2015*, Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2018, pp. 441–442.

position of the Norwegian side, meant that Poland did not take active steps to build the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline in 2007–2015. After the PO took power in Poland in 2007, it was not until 2013 that the investment was entered on the list of “Projects of Common Interest” and only in 2016, i.e. after PiS took power in Poland, did Gaz-System SA, together with Energinet from Denmark, develop a feasibility study for the Baltic Pipe project.

Conclusions

Poland’s great dependence on natural gas supplies from the Russian Federation forced the need to undertake actions aimed at creating a more diversified structure of gas imports. In this context, various political parties have advocated cooperation with key natural gas exporters, including Norway, and the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. The implementation of the investment, which was extremely costly and complicated, also required a certain amount of activity in the political field and convincing partners from Norway and Denmark to implement this investment. Political support was necessary given the suspension of the project by the government of Leszek Miller. In addition, the activity of PGNiG SA was an element that contributed to increasing Poland’s credibility with regard to the willingness to import natural gas from Norway, and the portfolio of mining assets under construction.

Undoubtedly, for PiS, the issue of the scale of natural gas imports from the Russian Federation and the politicisation of this problem was an extremely important challenge. Consequently, politicians from this group were in favour of building several energy projects aimed at building a more diversified structure of gas supplies. The development of infrastructure was important in order to connect the Polish energy system with the European system and to enable the purchase of natural gas on commodity trading exchanges on the continent. An indispensable element of this strategy was the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline and a regasification terminal on the Baltic Sea. As a result, steps were taken to build a diversified portfolio of contracts for the supply of natural gas, which was to ultimately lead to the required diversified structure of gas imports. An important postulate and goal was also to resign from the need to conclude agreements at the intergovernmental level, as such a situation caused the politicisation of natural gas supplies.

For PO, economic considerations were a key aspect of the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. In this regard, many politicians of this party stressed that a steady supply of this commodity at an attractive price was necessary for economic development. While PO politicians pointed to the legitimacy of infrastructure development, they were aware that any delays in the construction of the gas pipeline may adversely affect the level of Poland’s energy security. In this context, they

denied the legitimacy of completely resigning from cooperation with OAO Gazprom. As a result, it can be assumed that PO was in favour of building a diversified supply structure of natural gas, and the Russian Federation would play an important, but not the only role in energy cooperation.

To recapitulate, both PiS and PO were in favour of energy cooperation with Norway. However, the two groups differently emphasised the need to build the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. For PiS, this project played a strategic role in ensuring Poland's energy security, while for PO it was to play an important role in the diversified structure of natural gas imports.

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Polish-Norwegian cooperation in the field of energy security in the political thought of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO)

Abstract

The large share of natural gas supplies that are sent to Poland from the Russian Federation has been heavily criticised by many Polish political parties. Politicians from several political groups have emphasised the need to diversify the sources and directions of this commodity. In this respect, cooperation with Norway was to play a key role in ensuring the implementation of this scheme. The goal of this article is to analyse the political thought of Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS, the Law and Justice) and Platforma Obywatelska (PO, the Civic Platform) parties in the construction of the Baltic Pipe gas pipeline. The main research paradigm applied in the text is the analysis of testimonies and traces of political thought. Taking up the topic is important due to an overall lack of studies that show original findings of the standpoint of various political parties in Poland on the idea of building this specific type of energy infrastructure.

Key words: political thought, Baltic Pipe, energy security, political parties