Introduction

The term resilience does not have a universal definition, as its meaning greatly depends upon the context within which it is used. For the purpose of this paper, we will focus on the connotations assumed by the term within the confines of the security sector, where resilience has become associated with the concept of a state’s ability to respond to strategic shock, adapt, and continue to execute critical essential functions and services. It is important to note that in this context, the term state applies not only to government institutions, but also to the nation as a whole, including (but not limited to) individuals, society, and the private sector.

This paper examines two very distinct approaches to national resilience: the Australian Disaster Response and Resilience Model, and Norway’s Total Defence

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A tale of two hemispheres: Norwegian and Australian approaches to national resilience. A comparative analysis

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2 The author of this paper wishes to express his thanks to Dr. Alan Ryan, Dr. Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, Jan Sabiniarz, and Marla Keenan for their insight and support.
Concept. As will become evident, resilience can acquire significantly different definitions, depending very much on national realities and the country’s specific security context. NATO’s approach, for example, is very much centred on resilience as a military enablement and readiness tool, with a significant role in contributing to national and Alliance deterrence efforts.

Considering Australia’s most recent history, it is fair to say that the nation’s primary threat vectors have emanated from within, namely through ever intensifying natural disasters such as the bushfires of 2019–2020, which ravaged a significant part of the nation. It is therefore only natural that much of Australia’s resilience strategy is currently focused on mitigating threats from natural calamities. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) has played a major role in enabling civil society’s response to fires and floods. However, since 2020, there has been a significant strategic shift in Australia’s security landscape, as China’s aggressive posturing and hybrid actions have intensified over the past two years, causing Canberra to rethink how the nation looks at national mobilisation and resilience.

In stark contrast, since the end of World War II, Norway placed significant attention on a Total Defence Concept (TDC) which focused primarily (but not exclusively) on a whole-of-government approach to defending against conventional military threats. Essentially, it provided a structured approach to civil society enablement of the military. However, the concept has changed significantly over the years, particularly since the fall of the Berlin wall. With Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, there has been a renewed effort to bolster and expand the TDC. Today, it not only covers conventional threats, but also provides a comprehensive strategy for countering hybrid challenges as well, with some attention also provided to responding to national disaster.

The paper will provide a general overview of the two approaches to national resilience, and then seek to present those strengths and weaknesses of the respective models that are most relevant for the Polish context. In an attempt to provide tangible recommendations aimed at informing national resilience policy and strategy, the paper has sought to compare two highly specialised but very different approaches, with the intention of providing Polish decision makers with a diverse spectrum of potential resilience models from which to choose. To this end, extensive desk research, complemented by interviews with subject matter experts, was conducted, with a primary focus on institutional and legal framework analysis. While the comparative analysis was at times challenging due to the very different structural nature of the two national approaches, this ultimately proved to be highly beneficial as it potentially provides Polish leadership “with the best of both worlds” in terms of approaches to a truly comprehensive national resilience model.

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3 It should be noted that for brevity, the outline cannot be exhaustive. Instead, it aims at providing a brief overview of some of the key organisational elements of the two models.
Australia’s approach to resilience

As recent years have demonstrated, the Australian people have been required to demonstrate significant resilience. Between December 2019 and 2020, large portions of the country were ravaged by what became known as the Black Summer Bushfires. This catastrophic event would eventually take with it 3000 homes, 24 million hectares of land, an estimated 3 billion animals, at least 33 lives, with an approximated recovery cost of approximately 10 billion Australian dollars.Shortly after, many of the affected areas were struck by intense hailstorms and flooding. Then came COVID-19. Many analysts believe that the effects of climate change will continue to generate unprecedented environmental challenges for the country, therefore, with good reason, much of the Australian resilience and crisis response focus is on natural calamities. However, as will be highlighted later, the process of expanding resilience considerations to include a total defence approach is well underway.

Resilience within the context of natural disaster response

The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience centres its approach on the following four principles: Prevention, Preparedness, Response and Recovery, with the main emphasis being placed on Prevention and Recovery. Another guiding principle of the strategy is its “shared responsibility” concept, via which multiple stakeholders are empowered to directly participate in resilience building and crisis response, including individuals, families, local communities and authorities, the private sector (i.e., small and medium businesses), and state/territory and federal government.

As Australia is a federal state, the primary responsibility for resilience and crisis response has been decentralised and lies primarily with the state/territory and local authorities, with the national government primarily covering the roles and functions

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7 Australia is a federation of six states and two self-governing territories, which have their own constitutions, parliaments, governments, and laws.
8 Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience, op. cit., p. 1.
not otherwise assumed by the lower levels of governance. The federal government also retains operational and strategic capabilities which it can provide, upon request, to states/territories in times of crisis.

National government support during natural calamities is disciplined via the Australian Government Crisis Management Framework (AGCMF). This policy document identifies the principal stakeholders involved in the national authorities whole-of-government approach to natural and human-induced crises and resilience building efforts, as well as specifying their duties and responsibilities.9 Finally, the AGCMF also outlines the processes and procedures through which the federal government supports states and territories.10

The Crisis Response and Resilience Structure

At the federal level, a lead ministry is selected to manage the crisis.11 This choice will be dictated by the nature of the emergency, with the Ministry Responsible for Disaster Management leading natural disaster response, and the Ministry of Home Affairs assuming the role in case of threats to internal security or when there is ambiguity as to which ministry should take the lead.

The National Situation Room (NSR) is established12 and acts as the crisis operations room for the response. The National Coordination Mechanism (NCM – Figure 1) is also activated and serves to ensure that the full capabilities of the Australian, state/territory governments, as well as the private sector, are brought to bear during a crisis. The NCM core functions are coordination, communication, and collaboration amongst all stakeholders, but it is not a mechanism for command and control.13

The NCM is an ideal venue for coordination and de-confliction between all levels of government, the private sector, and civil society as a whole (including non-governmental organisations). Key decisions and outcomes decided within the NCM will inform situational awareness and actions within the NSR.

12 The NSR falls under Emergency Management Australia (EMA), an office of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA). The NSR is activated regardless of which ministry is in the lead, but always falls under the jurisdiction of the MoHA.
13 Australian Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, op. cit., p. 45.
Figure 1: The National Coordination Mechanism (NCM)


The lead ministry will activate the Australian Government’s Disaster Response Plan (COMDISPLAN) which, amongst other things, represents the mechanism through which states/territories can request non-financial assistance from the federal government. National level plans are augmented by state/territory plans, some of which are specific to certain types of emergencies (e.g., bushfires or flooding).

One of the innovative aspects of the Australian model is the establishment of the National Recovery and Resiliency Agency (NRRA), a concept born out of the Royal Commission Report into the Black Summer Bushfires of 2019–20. As a federal government agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs, this new entity is responsible for Australian government support to disaster-impacted communities. Deployed NRRA teams assess local needs and provide federally funded financial support across a range of programmes.

At the state/territory level, the same principles as those at the federal level apply, with a single agency taking the lead. As for risk management, emergency response,

16 Australian Government – Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, *op. cit.*, p. 50.
and recovery, all these are conducted at the lowest level of effective coordination, with resources and support augmented by regional and state-level coordination as required.\textsuperscript{17} It is this level of governance that is responsible for maintaining the readiness of its emergency services, including ambulance, state and rural fire and rescue, and State Emergency Services.\textsuperscript{18}

As state/territory emergency plans and structures vary slightly, it is not possible to provide a standardised disaster and resilience response structure. As an example, the New South Wales model has been selected. For identified hazards such as fire and flooding, a Combat Agency\textsuperscript{19} will lead and coordinate the government response and will establish a Control Centre (CC) at the state, regional and local level. In specific circumstances,\textsuperscript{20} an Emergency Operations Controller (EOCON) will lead the response and be supported by its own Emergency Operations Centre. If the EOCON is leading the response, it will coordinate subordinate regional and local level Combat Agency CCs. Coordination amongst state-level governmental entities is achieved through the State Emergency Management Committee (SEMC). While similar horizontal coordination committees are established at the regional and local level, it is important to note that these organisational entities do not have command and control functions.

Finally, the provision of Defence Assistance to the Civil Community (DACC) is actioned across six categories, with one to two being the most relevant to this paper.\textsuperscript{21} This type of support can include the deployment of the ADF personnel in support of local response in combating emergencies or disasters. Requests for assistance, where there is immediate threat to life or property, can be made directly from local government authorities to a local defence commander. Known as DACC Category 1, this support can be sustained for 48 hours by local arrangement. DACC Category 2 applies to assistance beyond this time scale and for a more extensive or continuing disaster response, which requires federal level approval.

While the Australian approach is currently very much structured around resilience within the context of disaster and crisis response, there are strong indications that the scope of the policy is slowly broadening. Tensions between Australia and China have increased exponentially since early 2020. Since then, the Scott Morrison


\textsuperscript{18} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{19} Combat Agencies include, but are not limited to, the State Ambulance, Fire and Emergency Services.

\textsuperscript{20} This occurs when no specific Combat Agency can be identified or when the leading combat agency requests to transition authority to the EOCON.

\textsuperscript{21} New South Wales (NSW) Government, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 22.
government has been discreetly working to expand and reinforce the country’s resiliency levels.

Despite having released its Defence White Paper in 2016, the Australian government ordered a review of the document and released the 2020 Defence Strategic Update. The document underlined the strategic threat posed by China, intensifying great power competition and the no-longer-remote possibility of high-intensity conflict. The document also specifically mentioned the challenges posed by grey-zone competition and the need for multi-agency cooperation, placing high priority on resilience considerations being integrated into defence planning. Other issues raised within the document include addressing the challenges posed by supply chain security and the defence of critical national infrastructure, particularly from cyber threats.

In December 2021, the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act (SCIA) of 2018 was further enhanced in order to include several new sectors, most of which coincide with NATO’s 7BLR. The changes also mandate that those responsible for critical assets (state or private sector entities) provide ownership and operational information to the Register of Critical Infrastructure Assets (CIA), which is managed by the Cyber and Infrastructure Security Centre. The SCIA also establishes obligatory reporting mechanisms which require CIA owners to report cyber incident to the Australian Cyber Security Centre.

Vulnerabilities of the Australian approach

While the Australian approach can be deemed as battle tested and proven, its frequent and ample recourse to military support in disaster response is somewhat a cause for concern. Many have argued this has impacted on ADF readiness and resources in relation to their traditional task. While it must be acknowledged that the response to civil emergencies is usually delegated to the reservist components of the ADF, it

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24 These areas included communications, financial services and markets, data storage or processing, defence industry, higher education and research, energy, food and grocery, health care and medical, space technology, transport, and water and sewerage.

25 This is a federal government agency.

26 Information provided by Dr. Alan Ryan, Senior Defence Advisor and former Executive Director of the Australian Civil-Military Centre, during an interview held on the 12 March 2020, via the Webex platform.
nonetheless causes a serious drain on defence and is a hindrance to its ability to prepare for tasks included in the 2020 Strategic Review, including high intensity conflict.

Finally, the most evident vulnerability of this resilience model is its scope. Australia does not fully appreciate the deterrence role of Total Defence Strategies and has thus far limited it to cyber resilience. Current resilience considerations need to be broadened beyond disaster response and must encompass both conventional and hybrid threats as well. This process would be greatly facilitated by a total defence-style approach. While there is progress within the Australian context of “mobilization” and its contribution to a more comprehensive resilience strategy, there are still structural challenges to be overcome. For example, a Rand Australia report from 2021 underlines that, beyond government coordination and limited private sector engagement, there is currently no concrete and institutionalised link between civil society and the military sphere to facilitate relationship building, particularly during peacetime, with regards to pursuing total defence/mobilization objectives. The paper also states that “the ADF does not effectively incorporate civil sector matters including social cohesion, citizen support, and material and psychological resilience, into its planning or doctrine.” But more broadly, Ewen Levick’s ASPI article from 2019 highlights the requirement for the Australian government “to combine the elements of national power, including defence, in smarter ways. In other words, our internal silos need to learn to work together.” To this end, it is imperative that a national mobilisation strategy and narrative are developed, as highlighted by another ASPI article from 2021, where the authors sustain that “[w]e[Australia] need to proactively and strategically establish a new national security narrative built around resilience embedded within a whole-of-nation construct such as total defence [...] What’s missing [...] is a more comprehensive and purposeful national mobilisation strategy that accounts for the links between the military, civil, digital, economic, social, and psychological domains.”

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27 During the Black Summer Bushfires of 2019–2020, it is estimated that approximately 20,000 military personnel took part in Operation Bushfire Assist; ibidem.
28 Mobilisation is the more frequent term used within Australian civilian and military spheres, as opposed to total defence.
30 Ibidem, p. 131.
Strengths of the Australian approach

While civil-military connectivity, within the context of the development of a total defence capability, still requires some work, the situation is not as dire as it might seem. Decades of support to civilian entities in response to natural calamities has contributed significantly to establishing the basis and essential framework from which more comprehensive engagement can continue. The current disaster response and resilience framework already provide excellent linkages between the civilian and military sphere, connections that have passed the test of exceptional calamities. Therefore, the interaction and engagement required to lead defence and civil society towards a true resilience-based total defence structure is already in place. It simply needs to be expanded upon and broadened in order to include national mobilisation in response to collective defence challenges.

Recent disasters have demonstrated that during the response phase, the connection and coordination between all levels of government and the ADF are not only already in place (as mentioned above), but have also proven to be sufficiently versatile, responsive, and effective. This is most likely, at least in part, due to the direct linkages between state/local authorities and local military commanders, as well as the ample margin of autonomous decision making granted to those commanders, particularly with regards to the authorisation of short term but immediate support to the civil community.

Australia’s approach to national resilience is extremely detailed, elaborate and truly a whole-of-society approach. Particularly noteworthy are the efforts to integrate and maximise the contribution of not only the various levels of government, but also other important stakeholders including local communities, non-government organisations and the business sector. The emphasis of the Australian disaster resilience model on prevention and recovery phase is also highly commendable. Enabled by the cross-societal approach highlighted earlier, these linkages facilitate the country’s approach to mitigate environmental threats, before they manifest, through early prevention efforts such as ensuring businesses have disaster response and continuity plans,\(^{34}\) as well as adequate insurance measures to ensure a rapid return to “business as usual.” The linkages between government and society also facilitate the work of the National Recovery and Resilience Agency in ensuring

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\(^{34}\) The focus on businesses goes beyond the traditional focus on providers of essential services and critical national infrastructure (i.e., food, water, and power providers). The Australian approach also encompasses small and medium-sized business owners, recognising that these elements of the private sector play an important role in the recovery of local communities. For more information on Australia’s whole-of-society approach to disaster resilience, refer to the Australian Institute for Disaster Resilience’s Handbook on Emergency Management Arrangements (2019).
the federal response and funding of early recovery is managed in an optimal manner. In fact, the local knowledge and understanding ensured by the whole-of-society response increases the likelihood of government resources being provided where they are needed most urgently. Finally, this level of cross-societal engagement, coupled with effective public communication, supports all levels of government in ensuring citizens have adequate information with regards to all phases of disaster management, including recovery, which provides a significant contribution to risk reduction and expectation management.

Total Defence Concept of Norway as a NATO member

As the international security environment becomes increasingly complex and contested, particularly by the re-emergence of great power competition across the globe, nations and international organisations like NATO are placing greater emphasis on countering hybrid threats and attacks beneath the threshold of war. During the 2016 Warsaw Summit, after closely monitoring Russian strategies employed against Ukraine in the 2014 conflict, the Alliance presented its policy on enhancing national resilience. Central to this work effort was the identification of what has become known as the Seven Baseline Requirements (7 BLR) for National Resilience, which represent key areas of strategic focus for Alliance member states as they seek to enhance their abilities to respond and adapt to strategic shock generated by adversaries.

The obligation to enhance national resilience is enshrined in Article 3 of the Alliance’s founding treaty, which states: “In order to more effectively achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Through enhanced resilience, member states improve their ability to endure strategic shocks and ensure that critical functions are uninterrupted, enabling the state to continue to resist adversarial

35 While resilience can be defined in various terms, for the purpose of this paper, we will adhere predominantly to the Alliance’s definition, which is: the capacity of each member nation to “resist and recover from a major shock such as a natural disaster, failure of critical infrastructure, or a hybrid or armed attack”; North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Resilience and Article 3, 11 June 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_132722.htm [accessed: 1 March 2022].

36 The 7 BLR are as follows: assured continuity of government and critical government services, resilient energy supplies, ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people, resilient food and water resources, ability to deal with mass casualties, resilient civil communications systems, and transport systems.

actions, include grey-zone competition, and enable both national and Alliance military operations. Further, by increasing national resilience during peacetime, NATO nations are essentially contributing to deterrence effects by ensuring greater readiness and responsiveness to hostile actions, while also demonstrating the capacity to inflict greater costs on would-be adversaries.

The Alliance’s approach recognises that national resilience begins with the individual, then the family unit, the community and ultimately, that of society. A cohesive and united society which fosters high levels of trust with regards to its public institutions is far less susceptible to malign efforts to undermine and destabilise the state, while at the same time increasing the likelihood that citizens will abide by resilience measures. Resilience is predominately a national responsibility. As such, how nations will seek to enhance their ability to respond to shock will vary and will depend upon a range of variables. Australia and Norway find themselves in very different security environments and face significantly different external and internal challenges. That is why their resilience models differ greatly, and also why they are such interesting systems to analyse, as each has very different strengths and vulnerabilities.

Norway’s Total Defence Concept has its roots in the immediate post-World War II period, but has morphed over the years, reflecting geopolitical changes and the developments within the international security structure. Today, the TDC supports the three lines of effort of the Norwegian defence strategy, as well as building national resilience and reducing vulnerabilities when faced with hybrid threats. The effective employment of the national political, military, and economic instruments of power in an effort to fully mobilise the country’s civil society in support of Norway’s defence is seen by many allies as a model to replicate for various reasons. Perhaps the most important is the manner in which the Total Defence Concept reinforces national resilience, as defined by the Alliance. In fact, if one looks at the TDC framework and overlays it with NATO’s 7 BLR, one can easily appreciate the lines of continuity between the two, in particular, how the concept seeks to mitigate risks to sectors specifically referenced within the NATO strategy (i.e., energy, food and water security, transport and telecommunications, etc.), while reinforcing the nation’s ability to respond and adapt to strategic shock. However, as with all man-made things, nothing is ever perfect, including the Total Defence Concept.

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38 Three lines of effort of the Norwegian defence strategy: national defence, collective defence within the framework of NATO, and bilateral support and reinforcement arrangements with close allies.

Resilience within the context of the Total Defence Concept

The Norwegian model is based on four key principles: The Norwegian model is based on four key principles: 

1. **Responsibility**: the authority which is responsible on a daily basis for an area, is also responsible for prevention, emergency preparedness and for the implementation of necessary measures in emergencies and disasters.

2. **Similarity**: the organisation that comes into operation during crises should be as similar as possible to the organisation that operates on a daily basis.

3. **Proximity**: crises are to be handled at the lowest possible organisational level.

4. **Collaboration**: the public authority, private enterprise or government agency has an independent responsibility to ensure the best possible cooperation with relevant actors and agencies in the work of prevention, emergency preparedness, and crisis management.

Just as in the Australian model, the TDC also requires that a lead ministry be identified based on the nature of the emergency. The Emergency Council will select the most appropriate lead and in the case of disagreement within the Council, the decision will be taken by the Prime Minister. In the Norwegian model however, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MOJ) plays a central role. The MOJ is the designated lead for all emergencies related to public security, civil protection, and emergency preparedness. As for crises related to security policy (i.e., hybrid attacks), it is officially the MoD that will take the lead, although there will be some overlap with the MOJ. The Ministry of Justice and Public Security is also responsible for activating the Civil Situation Centre and exercises authority over the Directorate of Civil Protection (DCP). The DCP has various important roles including liaising with County Governors to improve municipal and regional public security and emergency preparedness; it is the access point through which international organisations

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41 The Emergency council is the highest administrative coordinating body at the ministerial level. It seeks to reinforce the central coordination amongst Norwegian ministries on emergency response matters.


43 Due to the nature of hybrid attacks, the line of demarcation between an internal security issue (MOJ in the lead) and attacks that cross the threshold of conflict, and therefore challenge national security (MOD in the lead), are extremely difficult to identify. For this reason, MOJ and MOD will overlap and must work closely in order to coordinate and de-conflict their actions.

such as NATO, the EU and the UN request and provide civil support assistance; and is responsible for the Norwegian Civil Defence.\(^{45}\)

The TDC has a robust cyber protection structure which is managed at the central level, with policy development divided between the MOJ (civil ICT) and MOD (military ICT). The National Security Authority acts as the ICT operational entity, coordinating responses to cyberattacks against critical national infrastructure and/or functions.\(^{46}\)

The Norwegian model demonstrates a detailed nuclear preparedness capability. Such events will be managed at the central level, despite numerous actors having executive functions in the regional and local areas. The Ministry of Health and Care Services holds the lead in this sector, with the Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority as the primary agency responsible for radiation protection and nuclear safety.\(^{47}\)

With regards to the protection of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI), the TDC identifies three principal stakeholders: the owners, law enforcement and the military. Norwegian Police will always have responsibility for the protection of CNI, even in war time. However, should military support be required, every effort should be made for this support to be pre-planned and will normally be executed by the Home Guard.\(^{48}\)

Coordination between the central authorities and regional entities, with regards to civil protection, is done through the County Governors, who represent the government at the regional level. The Governors coordinate the various municipalities located within their regional jurisdiction and are supported by the County Readiness Council. The Governors contribute to the provision, coordination, and prioritisation of civilian support to the Norwegian military, and they support contractual stipulation between the military and local private sector entities.\(^{49}\)

At the municipality level, core tasks include local risk assessments, emergency plan development and conserving emergency response capabilities assigned to the local jurisdiction. Municipality functions also include the establishment of Emergency Management Planning Committee and the provision of health preparedness measures and essential social services.\(^{50}\)

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\(^{45}\) The entity has a force of approximately 8000 people, it covers 20 regional districts, ensures civil protection measures in war time, and contributes significantly to disaster response events in peacetime.

\(^{46}\) A Joint Cyber Coordination Centre has also been established for the national coordination of cyber events between the NSA, the Intelligence Service, the Police Security Service and the National Criminal Investigation Service. For more information refer to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norwegian Ministry of Justice and Public Security, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 39–40, 56–57.

\(^{47}\) \textit{Ibidem}, pp. 41–42.


\(^{49}\) \textit{Ibidem}, pp. 63–64.

Vulnerabilities of the Norwegian approach

While vertical political integration and general coordination between the central government and the country governors would appear to be well developed and functional, there is potentially a requirement for further focus on interministerial cooperation and coordination at the national level. An analysis of the total defence governance structure would imply a possible underdeveloped interministerial coordination body on matters that would be of potential relevance to multiple ministries in times of crisis. This increases the risk of stovepiping and is a matter that is currently under review.51

In case of a hybrid attack and escalation into a conventional conflict, there is a delicate transition phases within the Total Defence Concept which must be addressed. During the lead-up to grey-zone competition and the potential escalation to full blown conflict, at some stage, despite the Total Defence Concept’s principles of responsibility and similarity, the lead ministry will most likely transition from the MOJ to the MOD. This shift will probably occur in the context of very dynamic developments within the area of operations and will represent a delicate and critical moment in the Norwegian authorities’ management of the crisis. Therefore, it is imperative that all stakeholders understand when and how this transition must take place and what their respective roles and responsibilities will be, in order to avoid any drop in operational momentum and ensure a smooth and rapid transition.

Strengths of the Norwegian approach

The strategy demonstrates a high degree of civil-military integration via a whole-of-government approach which has already seen significant work being carried out within the context of pre-established commercial agreements between the Norwegian government and critical service providers.52 The nation has painstakingly transitioned from a cold war era requisitions approach to the current system where the government has established solid relations with important private sector companies. These relations were then built upon in order to establish commercial agreements that should ensure the continuity of essential services in times of crisis (i.e., grey-zone competition) or conflict. Much of this contractual success has been facilitated by a robust national legislative framework which has not only effectively enabled this contractual

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51 Insight provided by Dr. Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, Vice-Rector for Research and Development of Oslo Met University and author of various books and papers on Norway’s Total Defence Concept, during an interview held on 11 March 2022 via the Microsoft Teams platform.

success, but has also established the required legal conditions for harnessing national capabilities in support of military enablement.

The empowerment of the MOJ as the lead ministry for disaster response and internal threats has numerous advantages. The principal benefit of this dual-hatted responsibility is that the government apparatus can easily transition from one crisis to another without key stakeholders having to adjust to new roles and having to apply different procedures. Furthermore, during both exercises and responses to real world emergencies, the same mechanisms can be stress-tested, and critically important experience can be gained by the same stakeholders, regardless of whether it is a disaster or internal security crisis-based scenario. Overall, this enhances the response capability of the structure and allows it to be fine-tuned more frequently, making the entire Total Defence Concept, both practical and adaptive.

Finally, the TDC is structured in such a way as to explicitly outline the principal means through which the military instrument of power is to plug into the civilian structure, both from a national and NATO perspective. The national Joint Headquarters act as the primary focal point for both the Alliance and the Norwegian military and it is through this structure that both entities access and integrate into the national political apparatus. This ensures there is a clear connection point between the civil and military sphere and facilitates not only greater integration, but also enhances greater coordination amongst all state and Alliance stakeholders.

Conclusion

The two models in question approach national resilience challenges in different manners, dictated by both their national particularities and their specific strategic threats. Both have their strengths and weaknesses, and in an ideal world, a national resilience strategy would integrate only the positives of the respective models. With regards to Poland’s current security challenges, the Norwegian TDC, with its strong NATO National Resilience base and general interoperability with Alliance military planning, would seem to be the more appropriate option. Also, considering Polish plans to invest in nuclear power solutions in the near future, replicating the Norwegian nuclear preparedness and disaster response capability would seem a logical step. However, the Australian approach to resilience is not without merit. A Polish model that is also able to places emphasis on extensive local level engagement and integration of local knowledge, especially with regards to vulnerabilities and strengths, would facilitate the state in providing more comprehensive risk mitigation and recovery strategies. This extensive network would also provide the basis for relationship building with the

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53 Ibidem.
54 Ibidem.
national defence forces, as they seek to develop further contractual agreements in an effort to ensure private sector support for the Polish military in times of conflict. Part of this solution is already present in the form of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF), which can provide that initial contact point and conduit between the national military apparatus and the communities within which they both live and serve. However, Poland would do well to take note of the dangers highlighted in the Australian approach with regards to allowing the military to become the instrument of choice with regards to response to national disasters. While the Territorial Defence Forces are mandated to play a role in such situation, the current security context along Poland’s eastern flank requires, at this particular moment in time, that the military (including the TDF) focus its training and readiness efforts on their primary task: the defence of the Polish Republic.

References

A tale of two hemispheres: Norwegian and Australian approaches to national resilience. A comparative analysis

Abstract

Paper conducts a comparative analysis of two different national approaches to national resilience in an attempt to identify useful considerations and recommendations for Poland: two models chosen were the Norwegian Total Defence Concept (TDC) and Australia’s National Disaster Response and Resilience approach. They were selected due to their different areas of focus: the Norwegian model is centred on societal mobilisation and its military enablement with the primary purpose of national defence against conventional military and hybrid threats, while the Australian approach is still focused on enhancing national resilience in order to respond to major natural calamities.

By examining both models and extrapolating their strengths while noting their vulnerabilities, the basis for a well-rounded national resilience strategy can be identified. While the TDC appears to best suit Poland’s current security challenges, the country would benefit from enhancing its comprehensive local engagement, perhaps through its Territorial Defence Forces. Caution should be exercised with regards to over-committing the Polish military in its support to disaster response at a time when the nation’s eastern flank is once again highly volatile.

Key words: resilience, Australia, natural disasters, Norway, total defence