Resilience and Resistance 2.0: initial lessons of Ukraine and the implications of resilience and resistance efforts to deter and respond to invasion and occupation by revisionist powers

Introduction

Given the challenges today, many nations are building national resilience – the ability of a nation to withstand and recover from natural or man-made disasters or disruptions.1 National resilience strategies are based on the range of potential threats, likelihood of occurrence, impact, and resource constraints. Many nations are also concerned about man-made threats including international and domestic terrorism,

1 Resilience is defined as “the will and ability to withstand external pressures and influences and/or recover from the effects of those pressures or influences.” O.C. Fiala, Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: Joint Special Operations University Press, 2020, https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=54216464 [accessed: 10 January 2022], p. 236.
below-the-threshold-of-conflict grey-zone operations – covert actions and disinformation operations – and military conflicts. To address these, nations are developing civil defence resilience – the combination of select civil and military defence capabilities developed and pre-positioned before and mobilised during a man-made national security crisis. Following 9/11, threatened nations focused their resilience efforts on civil defence measures to counter international and domestic terrorism. Similarly, nations within the spheres of influence of the revisionist powers – Russia and China – increased their civil defence resilience against grey-zone operations and conflict following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. The events of 2014 brought another aspect of civil defence resilience out of the shadows and into the mainstream – the necessity for countries bordering or within the sphere of influence of these revisionist states to prepare for invasion and occupation.

Building upon other national resilience and civil defence efforts, nations are not only preparing to survive invasion and occupation, the worst-case man-made disasters, but also resisting both. Resilience and Resistance (R&R) is the fundamental realisation that a nation can increase its resilience and resistance capacities against invasion and occupation in peacetime to deter threats. If deterrents fail, they have the capacity to respond. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 reinforced the need and value of R&R, it also signalled a strategic inflection point with respect to the R&R demonstrating the modern real-world need for R&R against revisionist nations. It is time to reimagine R&R based on the lessons learned from Ukraine to achieve R&R’s full potential, or R&R 2.0. R&R 2.0 is a whole-of-nation, but government-led, large-scale underground resistance organisation (URO) authorised in legislation for full development in peacetime to conduct

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4 Per Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulation, “(t)erritory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of a hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” Law of War: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV): October 18, 1907, The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, New Haven, CT, 2008, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp#art42 [accessed: 24 January 2022].

5 Resistance is defined as “a nation’s organized, whole-of-society effort, encompassing the full range of activities from nonviolent to violent, led by a legally established government (potentially exiled/displaced or shadow) to reestablish independence and autonomy within its sovereign territory that has been wholly or partially occupied by a foreign power.” O.C. Fiala, op. cit., p. 236.

6 Ibidem, pp. 8–14.
resistance to occupation and coerce, disrupt, or defeat an occupier in wartime. R&R 2.0 is not only a response option to an invasion but needs to be a fully recognised and accepted irregular deterrence option, co-equal to conventional and nuclear deterrents.\(^7\)

The research questions this study sets out to answer are: what are the initial lessons learned from the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?; what do they tell us about resilience and resistance doctrine and theories largely based on resistance efforts against the German occupations of World War II?; and most importantly, what next – what adaptations need to be made to make R&R more effective? To answer these questions, this study builds upon a large body of qualitative research on resilience, resistance, insurgency, and counterinsurgency conducted by the authors over the last decade via secondary sources, with direct exposure to the applications of theories developed through this research. The main theoretical sources upon which this study derives its findings include two published by the Joint Special Operations University: the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) and Understanding the Form, Function, and Logic of Clandestine Insurgent and Terrorist Networks, as well as the Comprehensive Defence Handbook published by the NATO Special Operations Headquarters.\(^8\)

### Resilience and Resistance 2.0

The Ukrainian irregular defence against the Russian invasion provides a modern example of the value of whole-of-nation resistance. However, the Ukrainian resistance was largely organised in-extremis right before and during the invasion to resist the invasion, not necessarily an occupation.\(^9\) Despite the admirable efforts of the Ukrainian government and people given the suddenness of the 2022 invasion, there are several

\(^7\) NATO additionally considers missile defence a third type of deterrent to conventional and nuclear. Deterrence and defence, NATO, 14 March 2022, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_133127.htm [accessed: 22 January 2022].


lessons learned that will inform R&R 2.0. At the heart of R&R 2.0 is the need to develop a viable URO at the right scale prior to a crisis during the resilience phase that can quickly respond to an invasion and occupation with legitimacy and purpose. This same concept should guide the development or transition of current efforts by countries building R&R capabilities into R&R 2.0. Countries developing R&R capacity should assess their current efforts and ensure that they have considered or implemented the correct lessons from Ukraine to increase the effectiveness of their R&R efforts. The goal of R&R 2.0 is to present revisionist powers with the toughest tactical, operational, and strategic irregular problems possible to complicate their calculus when they consider invasion and occupation as an option, and ideally, deter action. Creating intrinsic and extrinsic dilemmas – perceived or real – would re-establish deterrence based on the power of whole-of-nation R&R 2.0 capacity and mutually support conventional and nuclear deterrents.10 If deterrents fail, R&R 2.0 would provide resistance to the invasion and occupation, imparting cost on the aggressor by depleting its political will and domestic support and setting conditions for outside intervention or withdrawal in defeat. Even at scale, developing and maintaining R&R 2.0 is likely cheaper and more resilient than conventional weapon systems and capabilities.

The government-led R&R 2.0 efforts provide legitimacy, legal authorities, direction, control, and integrated capabilities to maximise the resistance potential of the nation's government, business, and civil sectors.11 Additionally, organising R&R prior to a crisis allows other nations to provide all types of external support at scale to these efforts in place of supporting them directly during an occupation. The pre-crisis external support alleviates the need and risk associated with boots-on-the-ground advisors conducting unconventional warfare in support of the resistance which has proven politically untenable in recent crises, as the Ukraine crisis has again demonstrated.12

The centre of gravity for R&R 2.0 is a large-scale, resilient URO which leads and conducts the protracted campaign of armed and non-violent resistance against

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11 The key to organising these efforts prior to a crisis is protecting the designated resistance members in much the same way a nation protects its intelligence and specialised military personnel from detection while also ensuring the organisation cannot be used for domestic political purposes.

12 Unconventional warfare is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.” O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 236.
Scale is critical. Historically, the underground – the hidden clandestine human and physical infrastructure – made up the largest portion of a resistance movement. For example, one of the largest UROs in history was the Polish Underground State of WWII which had over 300,000 clandestine members. The underground members have roles in the resistance requiring full-time clandestine lifestyles. This includes members of the shadow government (SG) – those elements of the government that stay behind during an occupation to lead and govern the nation’s day-to-day resistance. The auxiliary is the second component consisting of individuals from all walks of life who provide active, but clandestine support for the resistance, including collecting intelligence and providing logistics, while living their normal lives as cover for their activities.

Lastly, the armed element, traditionally called the guerrillas or partisans, are led by specially designated military personnel and may include a nation’s territorial defence forces (TDF) or home guards who provide the military capacity and expertise to the underground. The armed elements tailor their operations, operational tempo, and operational signatures based on the occupier and terrain. The armed elements may play a particularly active role in resisting invasion in support of conventional defence forces. However, in doing so, there is a danger that they will likely be exposed and unable to transition to clandestine operations during the occupation, negatively impacting the resistance to occupation. They may also operate as clandestine action cells

20 D. Jones, op. cit., p. 17.
in urban terrain or when under pressure from the occupier. In rural areas or under less pressure, they may take on more traditional military organisational structures and operations against the occupier.\textsuperscript{21} From the start, the organisational development, recruitment of members, training, and preparations should be bounded by a legal framework approved by elected officials and legislators who also provide oversight.\textsuperscript{22} Ultimately, scaling the three elements of the resistance to effectively counter the occupier is critical to the resistance’s success.\textsuperscript{23}

One key aspect of organised resistance is the continuity of governance to ensure continued sovereignty and legitimacy for the resistance upon occupation.\textsuperscript{24} Much like the legal frameworks for the overall resistance, legislative efforts should clearly describe the continuity of government process and organisational structure that articulates the roles and responsibilities of each element leading up to a crisis and under occupation.\textsuperscript{25} This should be integral to any R&R 2.0 legal construct and include the government-in-exile (GIE), shadow government (SG), and what could be termed a collaborative or cooperative government (CG).\textsuperscript{26} The GIE is responsible for carrying on the national identity to the outside world, gaining external support, and providing the overall legitimacy for the resistance effort against the occupying country.\textsuperscript{27} The GIE process for continuity of government is legislated, its members are pre-designated and trained, and the location is established during peacetime to ensure its viability and rapid transition in a crisis. The SG is the civilian-led underground organisation that provides day-to-day in-country leadership of the resistance as described above as part of the underground. The SG leads and directs all aspects of the effort and the employment of the tools of resistance, both violent and non-violent, through centralised strategy execution, but decentralised tactical implementation. The last element of governmental continuity is the CG which is given strict legal guidance by the GIE as to what it can and cannot do in collaboration or cooperation with the occupier to ensure the civilian population under occupation receives basic support such


\textsuperscript{22} Authors’ experience with similar efforts from 2010 to 2016; NSHQ CDH, vol. I, pp. 89–92.


\textsuperscript{24} As an example, see White House, *Continuity of Government*, https://whitehouse.gov1.info/continuity-plan/ [accessed: 5 February 2022].


\textsuperscript{27} O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, pp. 11–13.
as food, water, sanitation, medical, electricity, and public safety.\(^{28}\) The members of the CG should be explicitly directed via legislative action not to conduct any resistance activities to ensure they are not targeted by the occupier.\(^{29}\)

While the goal of building *resiliency to invasion* and *occupation* is to deter aggression, if these resiliency efforts fail, the organised *resistance to invasion* and *occupation* provides immediate response options for the nation being invaded. Ideally, this response buys time for the nation's bilateral or multilateral partners or allies to mount a counteroffensive, such as a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Article 5 response to re-establish the nation and NATO's territorial integrity. For nations without bilateral or multilateral defence agreements, such as Ukraine, then *resistance to invasion* and *occupation* supplements conventional military capabilities with the goal of decreasing the invader and occupier's political will and domestic support and ultimately forcing them to withdraw. Attempting to build these capabilities immediately before an invasion, or even worse, during an invasion or occupation, is a strategically poor option. Countries can avoid this issue by organising per the principles of R&R 2.0 long before a crisis to ensure a viable capability. While organising a resistance is not a new concept, organising prior to a conflict as part of a nation's resilience efforts is new.\(^{30}\) Logically, organising prior to a conflict and not under the pressure of occupation is a better option if time, resources, political support, and expertise to do so are available.

Prior to and in the opening years of WWII, *resistance to occupation* traditionally started as grassroot efforts of the population to organise against the occupier, such as the French Resistance.\(^{31}\) WWII ushered in efforts by external powers to develop...
and operationalised combined civil-military units specifically organised, trained, and equipped to in turn organise, train, equip, and unify resistance forces at scale in occupied territories. The goal of these efforts was to impart greater costs on the occupiers as an integrated element of the Allied campaign plan and the overall war effort. Specifically, the British conceived of and established the Special Operations Executive (SOE), quickly followed by the American version called the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). After some fits and starts, both organisations ultimately succeeded in harnessing the power of the people’s resistance against German occupation throughout Europe. The disorganised nature of resistance at the time caused operational issues among clandestine groups, routinely unaware of other cells operating in their areas. Uncoordinated resistance efforts also resulted in security compromises, in-fighting – especially among groups with different political leanings – hostile penetrations of groups by the occupier, retaliation against civilians, and a lack of coherent tactical or operational-level resistance campaigns. Overall, the SOE and OSS efforts to organise disparate groups were remarkably successful and set the stage for the Cold War era and present-day intelligence organisations and military special operations forces (SOF) which developed units and doctrinal concepts specifically to support and organise these types of efforts behind enemy lines.

The Cold War efforts by external powers, such as the US, were focused on building “stay-behind networks” in Europe against Soviet invasion. These networks were designed to stay in place during an invasion, and then conduct sabotage, subversion, and guerrilla warfare against the occupier. Most programmes failed to achieve the desired goals or fell victim to controversy due to concerns the efforts were used for domestic political action, such as Operation Gladio in Italy. However, there are successful examples of Cold War development of pre-crisis resistance capacities such as the Swiss, who developed resistance cadres to conduct guerrilla and non-violent resistance if their neutrality was violated and they were occupied. They envisioned cadres building the rest of the URO through clandestine recruitment efforts once under occupation. It is unknown if this cadre-centric option would have

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been successful. From the end of the Cold War to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2014, various nations attempted to develop or maintain R&R capacities, in some cases working quietly with external partners via bilateral agreements with various levels of success. The events in Ukraine in 2014 caused a shift in acceptance of R&R and willingness for multi-lateral discussions on the topic.

As a result, over the next six years, two efforts focused on establishing baseline doctrine for R&R. Both were heavily based on the European experiences and lessons learned from organised resistance experiences of WWII, the Cold War, and the resurgence of efforts in the Baltics before 2014. The first effort was led by Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), partnered with the University of Sweden, and included several countries from the region who participated and provided their unique R&R experiences and expertise. This effort ultimately resulted in the 2020 publication of the Resistance Operating Concept (ROC), the first to capture historical examples and theory of R&R in a single document. The ROC framed R&R efforts as part of a whole-of-nation effort called Total Defence, recommended the ministry of defence (MOD) lead, and standardised the language and some basic principles and doctrine among nations that participated in its development.

The second effort, led by the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), followed suit with the 2020 publication of the two-volume Comprehensive Defence Handbook (CDH). While similar to the ROC, it moved away from some of the historically-bound ROC language which used terms like resistance and guerrillas, to the more politically acceptable language of asymmetric defence component and the adapted force, respectively. Additionally, the CDH attempted to focus on application over theory, especially in the second volume, which is more of an actionable checklist. In place of the ROC’s Total Defence, the NSHQ doctrine coined the term Comprehensive Defence, a similar concept consisting of a whole-of-society R&R. Even though both are valuable references and provide foundational concepts for developing pre-crisis R&R, the implementation of these concepts has understandably proven difficult due to constraints such as political will (culture, resources, and time), competing defence priorities, actual versus desired R&R capacity, and the availability of R&R subject matter expertise.

36 Author’s SOCEUR experiences from 2010 to 2012.
37 O.C. Fiala, op. cit.
One issue the ROC and CDH inadvertently contributed to is the proclivity for the military to take the lead, which has militarised many of the R&R efforts today. There are two additional reasons for this militarisation – having the MOD or SOF in the lead and relying on territorial defence forces or home guards to serve as the “armed resistance” elements within the country’s R&R. The MOD in the lead is problematic for the reasons already mentioned – civilian control of R&R is the same as civilian control of the military – it ensures legitimacy and oversight. This is especially important in an organisation like a national resistance where government and private citizens are the largest portions of a properly balanced resistance organisation. SOF in the lead is an issue because few SOF are trained as R&R experts above the tactical level. Leveraging TDF or home guards to lead R&R further fuels the militarisation of these efforts. Lastly, R&R efforts tend to get accepted by the Ministry of Defence elements long before the government’s civilian leaders and other ministries and agencies accept and participate. Without proper civilian oversight, R&R efforts lack critical senior civilian sponsorship to lead R&R nationally and top-down to ensure the required legitimacy in peacetime or war. Lastly, political sensitivities constrain or degrade R&R and limit preparedness prior to a crisis. The Ukraine crisis has exposed the impacts of pre-crisis political constraints and should be instructive to R&R efforts.

Ukraine 2022 R&R review

Reviewing the 2022 R&R efforts in Ukraine provides numerous strengths and weaknesses for other countries to consider in developing and implementing R&R 2.0. Four strengths stand out:
1) establishing the legal framework for R&R,
2) mobilising the population and world opinion to resist the invasion,
3) providing “how to resist” information to the society, and
4) leading as the wartime leadership of the government.

41 O.C. Fiala, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
42 The fact that both the ROC and CDH development and publication were SOF-led efforts is indicative of this trend.
43 For example, the US Army SOF are trained in supporting resistance during the various qualifications courses – Special Forces, Civil Affairs, and Psychological Operations. However, the development of subject matter expertise in R&R above the tactical level is largely dependent on individual operational experiences, advanced institutional education, and personal study of the subject.
44 Authors’ experiences. This is further increased by either unengaged or untrained civilian oversight of these efforts. For success, civilian oversight requires the requisite understanding of R&R theory, application, tradecraft, and planning.
45 The language changes between the ROC and CDH are a good example of attempting to make a tough topic politically acceptable.
First, Ukraine implemented an R&R law prior to the conflict known as the “On the foundations of national resistance” law providing the legal authorities for resistance, roles, and responsibilities across the government and society.\textsuperscript{46} The law designates the President of Ukraine as the overall leader of the national resistance, delegated through the Minister of Defence, who further delegates the leadership of the territorial defence to the Commander of the Ukrainian TDF, the leadership of the resistance movement to the Commander of the Ukrainian SOF, and the management of the citizens of Ukraine participating in the national defence to the cabinet ministers.\textsuperscript{47} Second, the Ukrainian population answered their President’s call to arms with Ukrainians from all walks of life taking up arms to resist the invasion.\textsuperscript{48} Additionally, the Ukrainian efforts on the battlefield and via information operations successfully mobilised global popular support.\textsuperscript{49} Third, the Ukrainian SOF successfully established a “how to resist” website, called the National Resistance Centre, with a variety of tips and tricks for members of the population to use to conduct active, non-violent, and passive resistance, as well as reduce their digital signature.\textsuperscript{50} Lastly, the Ukrainian government and the President showed superb wartime leadership, staying in the fight with their people and inspiring the admiration of the world.\textsuperscript{51}

Despite the significant strengths, there are five major weaknesses that must be considered:
1) missing elements of the legal framework and time to implement it,
2) lack of a continuity of government plan,

\textsuperscript{47} Ibidem, Article 1, paragraph 1 (President); Article 7, paragraph 2 (Territorial Defence Forces); Article 7, paragraph 3 (Special Operations Forces); and Article 7, paragraph 4 (Cabinet Ministers).
\textsuperscript{50} While this website is exceptionally well-produced, it is unclear if it was effective in arming the population with basic resistance information or if they could even access the site from within Ukraine. Special Operations Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, National Resistance Center, Ukrainian Government, 2022, https://sprotyv.mod.gov.ua/ [accessed: 7 March 2022].
3) lack of overall civilian leadership of the R&R effort,
4) focus on overt and armed *resistance to invasion* over clandestine *resistance to occupation*, and
5) the failure of R&R to deter Russia from invading.

First, the legal framework did not clearly explain the integration of the designated elements – the territorial defence, the resistance movement, and the citizens for national resilience. Each is overseen by different elements of the military and government, with no clear overarching structure. Additionally, while it is apparent that the *resistance to invasion* – developed *in-extremis* – was effective, it is unclear if the law was passed and implemented in enough time for *resistance to occupation* to be developed.\(^{52}\)

Second, there was no published continuity-of-government plan, no succession of leadership if the President of Ukraine is killed or captured, no GIE plan, or an explanation of the timing or when the SG elements within occupied territories would begin to operate or under what authorities to ensure the SG’s legitimacy. The lack of a plan had the western powers scrambling to set conditions for a government-in-exile.\(^{53}\) Having a published plan ensures the government, population, international community, and the adversary understand sovereignty will be retained, the government will continue through the GIE, the SG will run the day-to-day *resistance to occupation*, and the CG will ensure the population has basic services.

Third, the Ukrainian national resistance law does not have a clear overarching civilian control. Although it identifies the President as Commander in Chief followed by the Minister of Defence, this does not equate to civilian oversight, which should rest on legislators, or non-MOD civilian leaders to ensure legitimacy. Like all defence efforts, having civilian oversight is key, and in many ways, even more important when establishing a national resistance to ensure it is legitimate and cannot become a political tool in domestic politics.

Fourth, the resistance to date has been heavily focused on armed *resistance to invasion*, consisting primarily of overt civil-military militias, with few indicators of a parallel organised clandestine *resistance to occupation*. This may have been

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\(^{52}\) Although the Ukrainian territorial defence forces (TDF) and non-TDF civil resistance should be more easily organised, even at scale, due to its inherent overttness, it was still developed *in-extremis*. Developing clandestine networks and infrastructure securely at scale takes significant time and effort. One can assume that unless there was already some of this done prior to the publication of the law, then it did not have time to develop. This will result in the Ukrainian underground developing along the lines of most historic *resistance to occupation* examples – under the pressure of the occupier.

impacted by the structure mentioned above that militarised the *resistance to invasion* at the cost of developing a viable and organized *resistance to occupation*. While the *resistance to invasion* is rightly focused on defeating the invasion, the *resistance to occupation* is critical should the first fail, especially for a country with no bilateral agreements. The focus on resisting the invasion presents three issues. The first, in a high-intensity fight, especially in urban areas, the overt resistance members, with very little tactical training, have a short life expectancy. The second issue, overt forces, which will also include remnants of the armed forces, will find it difficult to transition to clandestine resistance once the occupation is complete and the occupier begins a counter-resistance campaign.\textsuperscript{54} The third issue is the loss of any legal protections for armed civilians. This is problematic in that it provides the invader an exploitable grey area to legally target civilian areas potentially if there are armed civilians “resisting” or mixed in with civilians.\textsuperscript{55} Alternatively, developing an effective long-term *resistance to occupation* rests on the ability to develop and organise the URO at scale while ensuring the ambiguity of its members and their connections through clandestine form and function to make them hard to find, kill, or capture by the occupier.\textsuperscript{56} Ambiguity is critical to protractedness – the ability of the *resistance to occupation* to survive for the period of the occupation, which could be years to decades.\textsuperscript{57} If developed correctly, at the right scale, and with redundancy to survive counter-resistance operations, the URO can effectively wage a protracted resistance to maintain national will, impart costs on the occupier, degrade the political will of the occupier’s population and government, and ideally set conditions for a large-scale conventional response to defeat the occupier and re-establish territorial integrity. In other words, win by not losing.\textsuperscript{58} Lastly, despite all the efforts by the government of Ukraine and the West to increase Ukraine’s capacity to resist

\textsuperscript{54} This is the harsh reality that many *resistance to invasion* members face due to the fatal mistake of the media writ large using full names and showing faces in open-source reporting leading up to the invasion and after. Additionally, one must assume that the military members, including SOF, were likely known to the Russians prior to the invasion and will be on target lists. The size and impact of these lists will be much greater than the names of key Ukrainian officials who were reportedly part of a Russian strategic target list that caused an uproar in the media. These types of target lists should be expected. The US and coalition had high-value individual list after the fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan which drove the initial counterinsurgency campaigns.


\textsuperscript{56} D. Jones, op. cit., pp. 1–11.


\textsuperscript{58} D. Jones, op. cit., pp. 61–67.
an invasion, Russia was not deterred. Therefore, reimagining deterrence using R&R 2.0 requires reframing. 59

R&R 2.0 as a deterrent

Developing and maintaining a pre-crisis URO at a scale is time- and resource-intensive, but much cheaper than other types of deterrence. However, like all deterrents, irregular deterrents must be viable and, in fact, deter action. Achieving deterrence through R&R by denial is feasible. 60 Knowing that a country has spent time and effort establishing these capabilities should cause a potential adversary to pause before invading. Why? Because occupiers rarely succeed against organised and determined populations as recent history has proven. Even major powers, like the US and the Soviet Union, learned hard lessons over the last 60 years as perceived or real invaders and occupiers respectively, against organised resistance. 61 The US failed to win in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Soviet Union failed in Afghanistan and in the former Soviet states leading to the fall of the Soviet Union. In each case, the resistance to occupation developed ground-up, over time, and under pressure. The success of resistance against these major powers begs the question – would their strategic calculus have been different if the countries they occupied had organised R&R 2.0 at scale?

Given that there are no concrete real-world examples of an invader facing a URO established before an invasion, the closest modern historical comparisons are countries with inherent “high-clandestine” or “high-resistance” potential – a societal or cultural predisposition for organising resistance – in which the governments were overthrown, and the nations occupied. 62 Two recent examples stand out, Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11, providing two case studies that challenge conventional characterisations

59 Reframing in this case requires the ability to cognitively transition from strategic, operational, to tactical levels in the same instance to develop novel approaches based on each nations’ R&R requirements. Planners and policymakers alike need to think critically, holistically, and apply design thinking. This includes designing not just courses of action but alternative futures and then contingencies to address those futures. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph, New York, NY: First Anchors Book Edition, 1991, chapter 33.


61 For clarification, Russia and China are the “revisionist powers” of the article title. The term “major powers” is used here to specifically describe the US and Soviets and to separate this lessons learned section from the overall focus on R&R 2.0 against revisionist powers.

of occupiers and resistance. First, prior to 2003, the Iraqi government and population were predisposed to operate clandestinely because Saddam Hussein had built a surveillance state using clandestine human intelligence networks – snitch networks at scale – down to the family level. This clandestinely-skilled population, combined with a large number of former regime elements, quickly coalesced into a resistance organisation in which the clandestine nature was so good that experts were fooled into thinking it was a disorganised resistance in the early days of the insurgency. This conflict lasted a decade, but by 2011, the US no longer had the political will and domestic support to continue. While not a clean example since the Iraqi government was theoretically functioning, the Iraqi resistance did cause the withdrawal of the “occupier” and set conditions for the rise of the Islamic State.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban lacked clandestine capacity at their fall in December of 2001 but had a cultural proclivity for guerrilla warfare from the start. While the US and coalition overthrew the Taliban, they were hardly defeated. Instead, they waged a protracted war. The Taliban realised that guerrilla warfare against the coalition was difficult at best, and due to the continued counterinsurgency pressure, began to organise clandestinely. This included establishing a SG throughout Afghanistan with a GIE in Pakistan in preparation for their planned resurgence. With battlefield suc-

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63 Some readers may question the authors’ labeling the US and the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan as occupiers due to the characteristics of the enemy and our own biases. While the US and the coalition attempted to message that they were anything but occupiers, elements of the population and the enemy clearly perceived that the US and coalition were occupiers, and those the West would consider insurgents or terrorists believed they were the resistance. One does not have to agree with the characterisation, but the case studies are important because they provide useful lessons learned for R&R 2.0 and reestablishing deterrents given the resistance potential, size, tenacity, and longevity of both insurgencies despite intense counterinsurgency pressures, and the political outcomes in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The authors recognise that to understand the old cliché, “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” requires the reader to acknowledge, not necessarily agree, with the other’s point of view.


cesses, the Taliban gained space to operate in larger formations they transitioned to a war of movement across Afghanistan and forced the West to withdraw. Once again, they succeeded over two decades simply winning by not losing, causing the coalition’s domestic support to wane and resulting in political pressure to end the conflict. Given the outcomes from Iraq and Afghanistan, would an occupier be dissuaded from invading if faced with an established R&R 2.0 URO? Most likely. Realising this opportunity requires strategic reframing and strategic messaging to effectively establish R&R 2.0 as a recognised irregular deterrent.68

Conclusion

The initial resistance lessons from Ukraine have highlighted the need for continued R&R assessment and improvements. This study proposed the next generation of R&R efforts, R&R 2.0. R&R 2.0 is a whole-of-nation, but government-led, large-scale URO authorised in legislation for full development in peacetime to conduct resistance to occupation and coerce, disrupt, or defeat an occupier in wartime. Strong R&R 2.0 programmes that are civilian-led, legitimate, understood fully by the population and participants, and strategically messaged to the revisionist powers help to establish or re-establish the power of deterrence of these irregular capabilities in conjunction with conventional and nuclear deterrants. Ideally, if all the above lessons are applied correctly, these programmes will be part of the resilience efforts of the nation, deterring aggression, and never being needed to resist an invasion or occupation.

References


68 As the CDH states, “[i]f the [pre-crisis developed resistance organization] does not exist, it cannot deter [...]. [It] should be organized, trained and equipped before a crisis begins.” NSHQ CDH, vol. I, p. 45.


Guevara Che [E.], Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1998.


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Resilience and Resistance 2.0: initial lessons of Ukraine and the implications of resilience and resistance efforts to deter and respond to invasion and occupation by revisionist powers

Abstract

Civil-defence resilience capacities focus on man-made threats to national security. While terror attacks like 9/11 drove civil-defence efforts throughout the 2000s, the Russian invasion of portions of Ukraine in 2014 forced nations to build resilience against new threats.
These included covert grey-zone and disinformation operations. Additionally, the 2014 events forced nations bordering or within the sphere of influence of revisionist nations to begin to prepare for possible invasion and occupation. Recognition of these threats resulted in two multinational doctrinal concepts that set the stage for what is collectively referred to as resilience and resistance (R&R). Resilience is the efforts by a nation prior to a conflict to build pre-crisis capacity to resist a host of threats, including invasion and occupation, in hopes of deterring threat actions. If deterrence fails, then the efforts transition into resistance to invasion and occupation. The Russian 2022 invasion of Ukraine demonstrated the need for R&R and the strengths and weaknesses of national resistance in action. This event is a strategic R&R inflection point. Nations developing R&R should reflect on and apply the lessons learned from Ukraine’s efforts and ultimately establish R&R 2.0 as an irregular deterrent on par and mutually supporting conventional and nuclear deterrents.

Key words: resilience, resistance, total defence, comprehensive defence