BTiP 2022, nr 3 – Artykuł 11



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Communicating the resistance

Otto C. Fiala | Col. (Ret.), US Army Reserve, Civil Affairs; Lukos LLC, Team Lead; Sensitive Activities Research and Development at US Army Special Operations Command
ORCID 0000-0002-9446-1742

„Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka”, 3/2022, s. 157-171
DOI 10.48269/2451-0718-btip-2022-3-011
PDF: English

Abstract: The article is an expansion and elaboration of the vital concept of communication or strategic communication, as originally expressed in the Resistance Operating Concept. It examines how a state that chooses to authorise a resistance organisation as part of its national defence plan communicates the existence of that organisation through the four phases: pre-conflict, crisis, occupation, and resumption of sovereignty. It also covers communication directed at specific target audiences (domestic, allied and partner governments and citizenry, and the adversary government and citizenry) during the lifespan of resistance. It broadly examines the actions and messages, or communication intended for each audience in each phase and the intended effects of such communication. Additionally, it focuses on the concept of legitimacy of resistance. This legitimacy is granted by authorising a resistance organisation through an established legal framework and by adherence to the law of armed conflict during wartime. A government establishing such an organisation must also consider the option of a displaced or exiled government in extremis, accounted for under international law, and its effect on communicating and continuing resistance. The article also references concurrent examples of effective communication from Ukraine during the 2022 Russian war on Ukraine.
Key words: resistance, resilience, warfare, strategic communication, communication, narrative, legitimacy, exiled government